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The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 630-4-401, 630-4-403, and 78A-4-l 03(2)(a)(i)(A). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Petitioner Jack Phillips ("Phillips") raises six legal challenges to the legality of the 
order of the Utah Securities Commission affirmed by the Utah Department of Commerce 
(together "the Agency") requiring him to pay a $413,750.00 monetary penalty, comprised 
of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in 
"investigative costs" for four violations of the Utah Securities Act. He also responds to a 
seventh issue concerning his preservation of these issues for judicial appeal. The seven 
issues on appeal are as follows: 
First Issue 
Did the Agency exceed its statutory authority under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 
when it ordered Phillips to pay a civil penalty greater than $10,000 per violation of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act? 
Standard of Review: This issue whether the Agency acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by statute and/or erroneously interpreted or applied the law is subject to 
judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403(4)(b), (d) and is reviewed by 
this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 
2014 UT 3, ~ 6, 322 P.3d 712. 
Vlll 
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014 
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001114-1115, and his Memorandum in Support of 
Request for Agency Review, July 16, 2014, R. at 001199-1200. 
Second Issue 
Did the Agency order restitution and thereby exceed its statutory authority under 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 when it ordered Phillips to pay $315,000.000 representing 
"investor losses" as one of three components of a $413,750.00 monetary penalty? 
Standard of Review: This issue whether the Agency acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by statute and/or erroneously interpreted or applied the law is subject to 
judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403( 4 )(b ), ( d) and is reviewed by 
this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014 UT 3, 16. 
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014 
Request for Agency Review, P. 5-7 (R. at 001114-1116) and his July 16, 2014 
Memorandum in Support of Request for Agency Review, P. 13-14( R. at 001201-1202.) 
Third Issue 
Did the Agency's order that Phillips pay a $413,750.00 monetary penalty, 
comprised of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," $78,750.00 in "fines", and $25,000.00 in 
"investigative costs" violate Phillips' right to be free of excessive fines under the Eighth 
Amendment? 
Standard of Review: This issue whether the Agency action is unconstitutional is 
subject to judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(a) and is reviewed by 
this Court for correctness. See, e.g., Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n Motor 
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Vehicle Enforcement Div., 2006 UT App 261, 18, 139 P.3d 296 (applying the "correction 
of error" standard to an Eighth Amendment challenge to agency action). 
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014 
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001117, and Memorandum in Support of Request for 
Agency Review, July 16, 2014, R. at 001202-1203. 
Fourth Issue 
Did the Agency act contrary to law and procedure where the Utah Securities 
Commission initially ordered Phillips to pay a $413,750.00 monetary penalty comprised 
of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in 
"investigative costs" without weighing the required factors in Utah Administrative Code 
R164-31-1, and then after administrative appeal of that issue, the Director remanded only 
the application of the R164-31-1 factors but not the penalty amount to the Commission? 
Standard of Review: This issue whether the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute, erroneously interpreted or applied the law, and/or engaged in an ® 
unlawful procedure or decision making process, or failed to follow prescribed procedure 
is subject to judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403( 4 )(b ),( d), & ( e ), 
·and presents a legal issue reviewed for ~orrectness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014 
UT 3, 16. 
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014 
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001110, Memorandum in Support of Request for 
Agency Review dated July 16, 2014, R. at 001189, and his March 6, 2015 Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of Request for Agency Review, R. at 001309-1310. 
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Fifth Issue 
Is the Agency time barred by Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1(1) from ordering and 
enforcing a civil penalty on one of the four alleged violations, the "GIT transaction"? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question whether the Agency acted 
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by statute and/or erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law, which is subject to judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(b), 
( d) and is reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014 
UT 3, 16. 
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014 
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001119-001120, and Memorandum in Support of 
Request for Agency Review, July 16, 2014, R. at 001205-1209. 
Sixth Issue 
Did the Agency improperly shift the Utah Division of Securities' ("Division") 
burden of proof concerning damages to Phillips by requiring Phillips to establish the 
value of emeralds purchased with the victims' investor funds that that victims took into 
their possession? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question whether the Agency 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law and/or engaged in an unlawful procedure, 
which is subject to judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-403(4) (d) & (e) 
and is reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014 UT 3, 
XI 
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014 
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001116, July 16, 2014 Memorandum in Support of 
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001213-1214, and March 6, 2015 Request for Agency 
Review, R. at 001310-1312. 
Seventh Issue 
Did Phillips properly file his judicial appeal of the Agency's monetary penalty 
after the Department of Commerce made its final affirmance of the justification of the 
monetary penalty in its June 5, 2015 Second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order on Review? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(d); Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 
2010 UT 27, 16,231 P.3d 1203. 
Issue Preservation: The Agency raised this issue sua sponte in the Department of 
Commerce's June 5, 2015 Second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
Review, R. at 001338. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The statutes and rules determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim in 
Phillips' Supplemental Addendum 1 and include the following: 
United States Const. Amend. VIII 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1 
Utah Admin. Code Rl 64-31-1 
Utah Admin. Code Rl51-4-708 
Utah Admin. Code Rl51-4-709 
Xll 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-4-403 ( 4 ), Petitioner Jack Phillips seeks 
judicial review of the legality of the Agency's order that he pay a monetary penalty of 
$413,750.00, comprised of$315,000.00 in "investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and 
$25,000.00 in "investigative costs" for four violations of the Utah Securities Act. Phillips 
appeals the monetary penalty on the basis that ( 1) the Agency is without statutory 
authority to order and enforce a monetary penalty in excess of $10,000 per violation, 
(2) the Agency is without statutory authority to order restitution in an administrative 
proceeding, (3) the monetary penalty is an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, ( 4) the Agency failed to apply the factors 
in Utah Admin. Code R164-31-1 when setting the penalty, (5) the Agency is time barred 
from ordering and enforcing a monetary penalty for one of the four violations, and (6) the 
Agency shifted the burden of proof and improperly required Phillips to disprove investor 
losses used by the Agency to support the monetary penalty. 
On May 23, 2014, after a hearing before the Utah Securities Commission, the 
Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which it 
found Phillips liable for four violations of the Utah Securities Act and imposed the 
monetary penalties referenced above, entered a cease and desist order and barred Phillips 
from the securities industry. R. 001127-1141. On July 9, 2014, Phillips made an 
administrative appeal to the Utah Department of Commerce, in which he raised the above 
issues of law relating to the monetary penalty imposed by the Commission. R. at 001110-
1123 On January 9, 2015, the Department of Commerce affirmed the amount of the 
Xlll 
monetary penalty, but remanded "solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the 
Commission's thought process and analysis with respect to the Subsection R164-31-1 (1) 
factors," which are the factors that the commission was required to apply to determine the 
monetary penalty. R. at 001282. The Department of Commerce concluded that this 
remand was necessary because the "Utah Court of Appeals would not have the same 
knowledge of the agency's precedent" and therefore the Commission needed to "state 
rather than imply its analysis of the [Rl 64-31-1 ( 1 )] factors in order to facilitate judicial 
review." R. at 001340. The Commission issued an Amended Order on February 4, 2015 
providing additional post hoc justification for the $413,750.00 civil penalty ("Amended 
Order"). See generally R. at 1090-1094. On June 5, 2015, the Department of Commerce 
affirmed. Thereafter, Phillips timely filed this judicial appeal of the June 5, 2015 Order 
and all Agency orders previously entered. 
On March 6, 2015, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-301 and Utah Admin. 
Code Rl 51-4-902, Phillips filed a Request for Agency Review with the Department of 
Commerce challenging the Amended Order as improper post hoc rationalization. R. at 
001309-1310. 
On June 5, 2015, the Department of Commerce affirmed the Commission's 
Amended Order. R. at 001332-001343. The Department of Commerce found that the 
Amended order was not impermissible post hoc bolstering because the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce was "able to conduct a meaningful review in 
light of the Commission's stated findings, its implied findings, and the Executive 
Director's own knowledge." R. at 001340 (citations omitted). Further, the Department of 
XIV 
Commerce purported that Phillips waived any right to appeal the issues supposedly 
settled in the Department of Commerce's January 9, 2015 affirmance because Phillips 
failed to request immediate agency reconsideration or judicial review at that time. R. at 
001338. 
On July 2, 2015 Phillips petitioned this Court for review of the Agency's action 
against Phillips, which encompasses the Initial Order and Amended Order affirmed by 
the Agency on June 5, 2015. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In an administrative adjudication, the Utah Securities Commission found that 
Phillips and a Tennessee resident named Elliott James, aka James Elliott ("James") 1 
violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act by soliciting Utah residents Bill and Gidgette 
Persch (the "Persches") and Paul and Sherry Reutlinger (the "Reutlingers") to invest in 
securities investments in: (1) a deal to import emeralds from Brazil and sell them in the 
United States (hereinafter the "Emerald Deal") and (2) a multi-level marketing 
opportunity called "GIT". See R. at 001097-1099. Based on its findings that Phillips 
committed four securities violations relating to these transactions, the Utah Securities 
Commission imposed a monetary penalty of$413,750.00, comprised of$315,000.00 in 
"investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in "investigative costs" for four 
violations of the Utah Securities Act and it also ordered Phillips to cease and desist from 
any violations of securities laws and permanently barred him from: (a) associating with 
1 James was named in the Notice of Agency Action, see generally R. at 498-501, but he 
did not appear. 
xv 
any broker-dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah, (b) acting as an agent for any 
issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and ( c) being licensed in any capacity in the 
securities industry for life ("Initial Order"). R. at 001107. 
Phillips did not challenge the Commission's liability determination, which did not 
require evidence of a culpable state of mind or of investor loss. Phillips challenges only 
the monetary penalty the Commission imposed. Phillips and the Utah Securities Division 
of the Department of Commerce stipulated to and/or the Commission found several facts 
relevant to the calculation of the monetary penalty, including Phillips' level of culpability 
and the quantification of investor losses arising from Phillips' violations of the Act. 
A. Relevant Agency Stipulations and Findings Regarding the Emerald 
Deal. 
In or about November 2006, James approached Phillips with a deal involving the ~ 
purchase, importation, and sale of emeralds. R. at 000948. After James approached 
Phillips regarding the Emerald Deal, Phillips relayed James' s representations regarding 
the Emerald Deal to the Persches and the Reutlingers. See R. at 001097-1098. 
Additionally, James made representations and promises directly to the Persches and the 
Reutlingers about the Emerald Deal. R. at 000949. Based on James' representations, 
Phillips, the Persches, and the Reutlingers all invested money in the Emerald Deal. R. at 
000949, R. at 001099. Phillips invested $250,000 of his own monies in the Emerald 
Deal. Id. Some of the monies paid by Phillips, the Persch es, and the Reutlingers were 
used by James and his associates to purchase 31 small barrels of raw, uncut "emeralds". 
R. at 000949. The rest of the monies were not returned by James and/or his associates. 
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R. at 000950. Phillips and the Reutlingers did not receive any of the monies invested in 
the Emerald Deal or any emeralds, and Phillips did not receive a commission on the 
Emerald Deal. R. at 001099, R. at 001092. Although the Persches did not receive cash 
from the Emerald Deal, the Perches took 21 barrels of the raw uncut "emeralds"2 out of a 
storage facility maintained by James. R. at 000712, 719. The undisputed testimony of 
Bill Persch is that he is in possession of 21 of the barrels of raw uncut "emeralds" from 
Brazil. R. at 000712, R. at 000719, R. at 000771. 
The value of the "emeralds" in the Perches' possession has not been established. 
In view of the conflicting and insufficient evidence of the value of the "emeralds", the 
Commission concluded that there was no "credible or admissible evidence" concerning 
the actual value of the "emeralds."3 R. at 001099. The Agency further concluded that it 
was not required to assign a value to the "emeralds" to determine the amount of the losses 
2 All versions of the evidence indicate that the stones in these barrels, referred to 
herein as "emeralds", have some value. However there is unresolved conflicting 
evidence concerning the value of the "emeralds", including whether the term "emeralds" 
properly applies to the stones in the barrels. At the hearing, over objection of Phillips' 
counsel, Bill Persch offered hearsay evidence of an unnamed appraiser who Persch 
testified told an agent named "Lemmon" and Lemmon told Persch that the 21 barrels of 
emeralds in Persches' possession were worth less than $10,000. R. at 000715-000719 
Bill Persch acknowledged that no one opened all of the barrels or bags within the barrels 
to make this assessment. R. at 000719, R. at 000772. Phillips placed into evidence a 
copy of an appraisal by an expert hired by the Agency, Tracy A. Bowen, which indicated 
that the emerald specimens he examined were worth $0.09 to $5.00 each. R. at 001029; 
R. at 001222-1223. Mr. Bowen had not determined the number of specimens in each of 
the 21 barrels of"emeralds." See Id. Additionally, Phillips offered testimony from Gail 
Cato, one of James's associates, that the "emeralds" were worth one to three percent of 
an appraised value of $12 million. R. at 001017-1018. 
3 
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to investors resulting from Phillips' violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. It 
characterized the "emeralds" taken by the Perches as an "offset" and assigned the burden 
of proof for determining the value of the emeralds to Phillips. R. at 001139. In the 
absence of sufficient evidence of the actual value of the "emeralds", the Agency 
determined the penalty in this proceeding based on money invested by the Pershes 
without concern for the value of the "emeralds" the Pershes obtained from James and his 
associates. R. at 001138-39. 
B. Relevant Commission's Findings Related to the GIT Transaction. 
James was also the Vice President of the multi-level marketing company known as ~ 
GIT. R. at 00 I 096. Phillips, the Persches, and the Reutlingers each purchased and sold 
the opportunity offered by GIT. R. at 000948. The Commission concluded that Phillips 
violated the Securities Act based on his representations regarding GIT to the Reutlingers 
and the Persches. See R. at 001103, R. at 001104. The alleged conduct regarding the 
GIT transaction occurred on or about July 2006. Id. at P. 3, ,r IO R. at 001097 
C. Other Initial Findings of the Commission Relevant to the Assessment 
of a Penalty 
The Commission found that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that [Phillips] 
received any meaningful financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other 
consideration from the transactions involving the Persches and Reutlingers." R. at 
001092. Additionally, the Commission found that there is no "evidence that [Phillips] 
has a history of previous violations" of the securities laws. Id. 
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However, the Commission faulted Phillips for statements he made when soliciting 
the Persches and the Reutlingers to join a conference call in which James would invite 
them to invest in the emerald deal, including that the emeralds were gem-quality, there 
was already a buyer on board, investments would be used as proof of funds, they would 
be repaid in 90 days, and there was no risk. R. at 001102, R. at 001103, R. at 001104. 
The Commission also faulted Phillips for not informing the Persches and the Reutlingers 
that he had not received payment from his own investment in the Emerald Deal 90 days 
after his own investment as James had promised. R. at 001099. 
D. The Commission's Post Hoc Justifications of the Monetary Penalty in 
Its Amended Order 
On January 9, 2015, after Phillip's initial administrative appeal of the 
Commission's findings, the Department of Commerce affirmed the amount of the 
$413,750.00 monetary penalty, comprised of$315,000.00 in "investor losses," a 
$78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in "investigative costs", but remanded "solely for a 
more detailed Order that discusses the Commission's thought process and analysis with 
respect to the Subsection R164-31-1 (1) factors," -- the factors that the commission was 
required to apply to determine the monetary penalty. R. at 001282. 
The Department of Commerce later explained that this remand was necessary because the 
"Utah Court of Appeals would not have the same knowledge of the agency's precedent" 
and therefore the Commission needed to "state rather than imply its analysis of the 
[R164-31-1(1)] factors in order to facilitate judicial review." R. at 001340. As required 
by the Department of Commerce's order on remand, the Commission issued an Amended 
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Order on February 4, 2015 providing additional post hoc justifications for the 
$413,750.00 civil penalty ("Amended Order"). See generally R. at 1090-1094. It 
bolstered its prior deficient reasoning by adding the following aggravating factors to the 
Initial Order: (1) Phillips' "predatory behavior in taking advantage of persons with whom 
he had a close, personal relationship"; (2) Phillips' failure to "cooperate" with the 
Agency to locate James; and (3) without citation, the Commission concluded that the fine 
is supported by "established precedent for a first offense." R. 001091-1092. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal concerns whether there are legal limitations on the amount of the 
monetary penalties that the Agency may order an individual to pay for violations of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. The Utah Department of Commerce has taken the position 
that after an administrative adjudication it may order an individual to pay a fine or other 
monetary penalty for a violation of any amount, subject only to Agency discretion. It 
also takes the position that statutes of limitation do not apply to the Agency's 
administrative adjudications, and so it may award monetary penalties for violations at any 
time. The Agency's position cannot be correct. Under Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20, the 
same statute that authorizes the agency to enforce the Utah Uniform Securities Act in 
agency adjudications, see id at § 61-1-20( 1 ), the agency is also given the option of 
bringing an enforcement proceeding in a judicial proceeding, id. at§ 61-1-20(2). If the 
Agency does so, or if it seeks to enforce an administrative order in a judicial proceeding, 
the statute limits the judge to imposing a fine of $10,000 per violation. Utah Code Ann. § • 
61-1-20(2). It would be illogical for the legislature to limit the authority to impose a fine 
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in only judicial proceedings, where the accused individual has the benefit of greater due 
process protections but at the same time allow the Agency to impose fines ( or other 
monetary penalties however designated) in this case exceeding $100,000 per violation for 
violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, especially for strict liability violations that 
that require no culpable mental state. 
As described in detail in this appeal, the Agency's position is in error because it 
ignores the requirement that the Agency enforce any administrative award through a 
judicial proceeding, in which the limitations on the amount of the fine from Utah Code 
Ann. 61-1-20(2) apply. In doing so, it ignores the Utah Court of Appeals decision in 
State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120,121 n.4, 231 P.3d 833, which explains that "[t]he 
fines that the [Utah Department of Commerce's Division of Securities] could impose and 
judicially enforce are . . . limited to $10,000 per violation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 6 l- l-20(2)(b )(viii)). 
A. The Monetary Penalty Is Unlawful and Unconstitutional. 
In total, the Agency made at least six errors of law in ordering Phillips to pay the 
$413,750.00 monetary penalty, comprised of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," a 
$78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in "investigative costs". First, as described, the 
Agency is without statutory authority to order and enforce a monetary penalty in excess 
of $10,000 per violation. Second, the Agency is without statutory authority to order 
restitution in an administrative adjudication; restitution is reserved to enforcement actions 
originally filed in judicial proceedings under 61-1-20(2). Third, the monetary penalty is 
an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
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because it far exceeds the $10,000 per violation set by the legislature in section 61-1-
20(2) and the standard fines for violations set by Uniform Securities Acts in other states 
throughout the nation. Fourth, the Agency failed to apply the factors in Utah Admin. 
Code R164-31-1 when setting the monetary penalty and improperly attempted to justify 
an improperly set monetary penalty with post hoc rationalizations. Fifth, the Agency is 
time barred by the statute of limitations applicable to judicial enforcement actions from 
ordering and enforcing a monetary penalty for the GIT deal violations, and sixth, the 
Agency shifted the burden of proof and improperly required Phillips to disprove the 
investor losses used by the Agency to support the monetary penalty. 
B. Phillips Did Not Waive His Appeal. 
The Agency purports that Phillips waived any right to appeal the amount of the 
monetary penalty, which it affirmed in its January 9, 2015 order, because Phillips did not 
request immediate agency reconsideration or judicial review at that time. It also argues 
Phillips waived his legal challenge to the Agency's decision to make only a partial 
remand of the findings on the factors. To the contrary, the January 9th order was not a 
final agency action subject to judicial appeal. The Department of Commerce remanded 
the case to the Commission to enable judicial review because the "Utah Court of Appeals 
would not have the same knowledge of the agency's precedent" and therefore the 
Commission needed to "state rather than imply its analysis of the [R164-3 l-l{l)] factors 
in order to facilitate judicial review." R. at 001340. In any case, under Barker v. Utah 
PSC, 970 P .2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998) and Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, • 
2000 UT 40, ,r 16, 999 P .2d 17, Phillips is permitted to wait until the last day to appeal 
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the "last final agency action" before seeking judicial review of all final agency actions. 




THE MONET ARY PENALTY IS UNLAWFUL AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE. 
After an administrative adjudication, the Agency unlawfully ordered Phillips to 
pay a monetary penalty for violations of the Utah Securities Act in the amount of 
$413,750.00, which the Agency explained is comprised of$315,000.00 in "investor 
losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and an additional $25,000.00 in "investigative costs." 4 R. 
at 001107. This monetary penalty is unlawful and excessive for three reasons. First, 
under section 61-1-20(2) the Agency may not enforce a monetary penalty of more than 
$10,000 per violation. In this case, the Agency found only four violations. Therefore, 
the maximum potential monetary penalty was $40,000. Second, the Agency unlawfully 
ordered restitution without statutory authority to do so and invaded the province of the 
judiciary by ordering Phillips to pay $315,000.00 representing "investor losses." Third, 
the monetary penalty is a constitutionally excessive fine in violation of Phillips' rights 
under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
A. The Agency Exceeded Its Statutory Authority by Imposing a Monetary 
Penalty in Excess of $10,000 Per Violation of the Utah Securities Act. 
In State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, the Utah Court of Appeals previously 
considered Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-20 and concluded that the Agency cannot 
escape the limit of $10,000 per violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act set forth in ~ 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-20(2)(b)(viii) by bringing an enforcement action in an 
4 The Agency provided additional justification for the fine in its Amended Order. R. at • 
001091-1092. But, as will be discussed below, the Agency's post hoc rationalizations are 
contrary to law, improper, and must be disregarded. 
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administrative proceeding under Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-20(1 ). Utah Code Ann. § 
6 l-1-20(2)(b )(vii) applies to judicial actions brought in the court in the first instance, as 
well as to actions to enforce a decision of the agency under 61-1-20(1). See State v. 
Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, 121 n.4, 231 P.3d 833. Therefore, in State v. Bushman, the 
Utah Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]he fines that the [Utah Department's Division of 
Securities] could impose and judicially enforce are ... limited to $10,000 per violation" 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6 l-l-20(2)(b )(viii)). That same rule should be applied in 
this case. 
Section 61-1-20(1) of the Securities Act provides that, after an adjudicative 
hearing, the Agency may issue an order and impose any combination of three available 
remedies: ( 1) an order against the respondent to cease and desist the activity constituting 
a violation of securities laws, (2) a fine, and (3) a bar or suspension which prevents the 
respondent from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in the 
state of Utah. See Utah Code Ann.§ 61-l-20(l)(e)-(h). The "fine" is the only monetary 
penalty the Agency is authorized to impose in an administrative proceeding. To enforce 
an order entered by the Agency, the Division must file an action in district court pursuant 
to§ 61-1-20(2)(a).5 This civil enforcement action triggers the limitations of§ 61-1-
5 The Utah Division of Securities of the Department of Commerce argued in its 
response to Phillips request for agency review that it is not required to follow the 
procedure of 61-1-20(2) to enforce an Agency Order. It claims it can enforce an Agency 
order in the district court by simply filing an "Abstract of Award" R. at 001231. Once 
the abstract is recorded, the Division claims orders such as the Agency's order against 
Phillips are "given a civil district court case number and collection activities such as 
garnishments and executions through writs begin." Id. However, the Division cites no 
statutory or regulatory authority for this proposition. Id. The Division merely cites past 
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20(2)(b)(viii). See Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep 't of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 
940-41 (Utah 1997) ("[A] suit to enforce such an administrative decision or order [under 
predecessor statute Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-19(l)(a) (1993)] is an original and 
independent proceeding, and such actions are actions at law ... and are not actions in the 
administrative decision or order."). Section 61-l-20(2)(b) limits the district court in what 
Agency-imposed penalties it can enforce. Specifically, under subsection (2)(b)(viii) a 
district court is only allowed to enforce ''fines" up to $10,000 for each violation of the 
Securities Act. Therefore, the amount of any monetary penalty assessed in an 
administrative proceeding is limited to $10,000 per violation. In State v. Bushman, This 
Court recognized this syllogism observing: 
[T]he the fines that the Division could impose and judicially enforce were 
limited to $ 500 for each violation of the Act at the time of the entry of the 
Consent Order, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20(2)(b )(vii) (2006), and are 
now limited to $ I 0,000 per violation, see id. § 6 l-1-20(2)(b )(viii) (Supp. 
2009). 
Bushman, 2010 UT App 120,121 n.4. 
As in Bushman, this court should reject the proposition now asserted by the 
Agency in this case that the Agency could simply avoid the limitation of civil penalties to 
$10,000 fine per violation in Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20(2) by filing the case in an 
course of conduct, which is nothing but a previously unchallenged practice. Id. 
Regardless, the Division is describing a civil action of enforcement, thus triggering the 
limitations of§ 61-1-20(2)(b )(viii). See Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep 't of 
Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 940-41 (Utah 1997) ("[A] suit to enforce such an 
• 
administrative decision or order [ under predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b- • 
19(l)(a) (1993)] is an original and independent proceeding, and such actions are actions 
at law ... and are not actions in the administrative decision or order."). 
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administrative adjudication.6 Bushman, 2010 UT App 120. Because the Agency must 
enforce any orders through Utah Code section 61-1-20(2), the $10,000 fine per violation 
limitation applies to limit the monetary penalty imposed by the Agency in this case. 
Therefore, a fine or other monetary penalty of any amount in excess of $10,000 per 
violation. With a maximum of four violations, the monetary penalty in this matter can be 
no more than $40,000 total, inclusive of "investor losses" and "investigative costs", 
which are not separately permitted under Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(1). Therefore, the 
Division's order that Phillips pay a fine of $413,750.00 is unlawful.7 
Bolstering this plain language interpretation of Section 61-1-20, this Court's 
interpretation of the Uniform Securities Act as limiting all fines for violations to $10,000 
per violation is consistent with the majority of other states who have adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act. Almost every state that has adopted the Uniform Securities Act has 
capped their respective securities agencies to a maximum fine per violation, frequently in 
6 To enforce Utah's Uniform Securities Act, the Agency may either bring a 
judicial action in district court in the first instance, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20(2), or it 
may proceed through an administrative adjudication, see id§ 61-1-20(1). Although the 
administrative adjudicative proceeding may be faster and may give the agency additional 
control over the proceeding, the penalties available in an administrative proceeding are 
circumscribed. For instance, Utah Code Ann. § 6 l-1-20(2)(b) allows the district court to 
order restitution. No similar authority is provided to the Agency in an administrative 
adjudicative proceeding. Furthermore an agency order ultimately can only be enforced 
by a judicial proceeding subject to Utah Code Ann § 62-l-20(2)(b ). 
These sections work in concert and must be interpreted in together. It would be 
irrational to apply a $10,000 limitation on fines imposed in district court where the 
f roceedings offer additional due process violations. 
Even if the Court only considered the purported "fine" of $78,750.00 representing four 
violations of the Securities Act, the Agency's fine is $38,750.00 greater than the statutory 
maximum. See generally R. at 001095-1109. 
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the $10,000 range as imposed by the Utah Securities Act. 8 The Utah Uniform Securities 
Act requires this Court to interpret the Utah Uniform Securities Act in conformity with 
the states that have adopted the Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-27. 
Additionally, this Court's interpretation of§ 61-1-20 is the most logical reading of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. It would be specious for the legislature to allow the 
8 See Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 45.55.920 (b) (limiting the administrator to $2,500 for a 
single violation, not to exceed $25,000 for multiple violations); Arkansas, Arkansas Code 
Ann. § 23-42-209(a)(2)(C)(ii)(a) (limiting the commissioner to $10,000 per violation); 
Delaware, 6 Del. Admin. Code§ 73-601(b) (limiting the director to $10,000 per 
violation); Hawaii, Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 485(A)-604(d) (limiting the commissioner to 
$50,000 per violation); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 30-14-604(d) (limiting the director to 
$5,000 per violation); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. § 23-19-6-4 ( d) (limiting the 
commissioner to $10,000 per violation); Iowa, Iowa Code § 502.604( 4) (limiting the 
administrator to $5,000 per violation); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-12a604(b) (limiting 
the administrator to $25,000 per violation); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 292.500(14) 
(limiting commissioner to $20,000 per violation); Maine, 32 Me. Rev. Stat. § 16604(4) 
(limiting the administrator to $5,000 per violation); Maryland, Md. Corp. & Assoc. Code 
Ann. § 11-701.1 (b )( 4) (limiting the commissioner to $5,000 per violation); 
Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110A, § 407A(a)(limiting the secretary of state to 
$25,000 per violati_on); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws§ 45 l.2604(4)(a) (limiting the 
administrator to $10,000 per violation); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. 80A.8 l ( d) (limiting the 
administrator to $10,000 per violation); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-71-613(d)(l) 
(limiting the administrator to $25,000 per violation); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 30-10-
305(3) (limiting the commissioner to $5,000 per violation); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 90.630 (2)(d) (limiting the administrator to $25,000 per violation); New Hampshire, 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421-B:26(1) (limiting administrative fines to $2,500 per violation); 
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 49:3-70.1 (limiting the civil penalty for a first time offender 
to $10,000); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-47(c)(l) (limiting administrator to 
$2,500 for a single violation or up to $25,000 for multiple violations in a single 
proceeding); Oklahoma, 71 Oki. St. § l-604(D) (limiting administrator to $5,000 for a 
single violation or $250,000 for multiple violations on a registrant); South Carolina, S.C. 
Code Ann. § 35-l-412(c) (limiting commissioner to $10,000 per violation); South 
Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws§ 47-31B-604(d) (limiting director to $10,000 per violation); 
Vermont, 9 V.S.A. § 5604(d) (limiting Commissioner to $15,000 for each violation); 
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 551.604( 4) (limiting administrator to $5,000 per violation); 
Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. § l 7-4-124(f)(ii) (limiting the secretary of state to $250 per 
violation, and not more than $10,000 in a single proceeding). 
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Agency to impose a higher fine than the Division is capable of enforcing in the district 
court. Without this important statutory limitation, the Division would never exercise its 
authority originally in the district court. The Division would have no reason or incentive 
to do so. The Agency could impose a fine, no matter how large the fine or how old the 
underlying conduct, see infra, without the additional due process constraints placed on 
the Division in district court. The Court should avoid interpreting the Securities Act in a 
manner that renders portions of the statute '"superfluous or inoperable."' Brent Brown 
Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 1 11 ( citations omitted). 
Conversely, the district court enforcement of an Agency order does not render the 
Agency administrative action available through Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(1) 
superfluous. The legislature provided a dual system that offers the Division the option of 
bringing offenses before the Agency in an administrative proceeding that is inherently 
less economically burdensome.9 Further, the role of the district court in an action to 
enforce an order is more limited than the original enforcement proceeding brought in 
district court. In the former, the court is focused on whether the Agency has exceeded its 
jurisdiction by, for example, imposing a fine that cannot be rendered into judgment 
within the terms of§ 61-1-20. If the Agency properly executes fines within the scope of 
§ 61-1-20, the enforcement action will not be a substantial hurdle to the enforcement of 
administrative orders. Conversely, if the Division wishes to seek a broader order, 
encompassing restitution and disgorgement, it can bring the action originally in the 
9 For example, the Division is free to introduce credible hearsay testimony and is 
not constrained to the procedural limitations of the district court. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 630-4-206( I)( c ); Utah Rules of Evidence R. 802. 
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district court where the defendant is provided with more procedural protections. See § 
61-l-20(2)(b)(i)-(ix). The Agency's enforcement authority in Section 61-1-20(1) was 
not designed to shortcut the important due process limitations of a district court 
proceeding. The Agency exceeded its authority under§ 61-1-20(1) and the Agency's 
fine against Phillips must be vacated. 
B. The Agency Exceeded Its Statutory Authority by Imposing Restitution 
on Phillips. 
The Agency's inclusion of an order to pay $315,000.00 representing "investor 
losses", R. at 001107, as part of the monetary penalty is an order of restitution, which 
improperly invades the province of the district court. 10 Section 61-1-20 provides that, 
after an administrative hearing, the Agency may issue an order and impose any 
combination of the three available remedies: (1) injunctive relief, (2) afine, and (3) a bar o 
from associating with any licensed broker-dealer or investment advisor in Utah. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-20( 1 )( e )-(h) . If the Division chooses to bring suit originally in a 
district court, the district court may impose broader remedies including, but without 
limitation, disgorgement, rescission, or "restitution." See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
20(2)(b )(i)-(ix) ( emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between remedies 
available to the Agency and the district court under the Securities Act. In Mack v. Utah 
State DOC, the Court stated: 
Utah Code section 61-1-20 allows the Division to use adjudicative 
procedures in the administrative forum to petition the Division of Securities 
10 See supra note 2. 
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director to enter a cease and desist order, impose fines, and bar persons 
from the securities industry in the state of Utah. Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20(1) 
. Under the same section, the Division may also bring an action in district 
court to enforce compliance with the Act or any rule made pursuant to the 
Act. Subsection 2 grants the district court jurisdiction to issue equitable 
relief, order disgorgement and rescission, impose fines, or 'enter any other 
relief the court considers just.' 
Mack v. Utah State, 2009 UT 47, ~ 27,221 P.3d 194,202 (citations omitted). The 
remedies available to a district court under § 61-1-20(2) , including restitution, are not 
available to the Agency. 11 
Supporting the conclusion that the "investor loss" component of the monetary 
penalty is an improper award of restitution, are statements from the Division's Director, 
Keith Woodwell. In an interview with the Salt Lake Tribune, Mr. Woodwell indicated 
that the Division had eannarked any money collected from Phillips to be provided to 
investors through Utah's whistleblower statute. 12 Section 61-1-20 does not give the 
Division the authority to do an end-run around the district court by seeking an Agency-
imposed fine representing "investor losses" and then paying these "investor losses" to 
investors through Utah's whistle blower statute. 
11 Bolstering this proposition is Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-l 8.5(2)(a) which states "The 
commission shall ... except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), and consistent with Section 
61-1-20, impose a sanction as provided in this chapter." (emphasis added). Here the 
legislature has expressly limited the Agency to remedies found in subsection l(a). 
12 Tom Harvey, Oregon Man Liable for Emerald Scam, Utah Panel Says, The Salt Lake 
Trib. (Mar. 29, 2014 ), available at http:/ /m.sltrib.com/sltrib/mobile3/58004 l 48-
219/phillips-utah-case-securities.html.csp (stating, "Phillips can receive credit if he 
repays investors. If not, the state can provide investors any money it recovers through a 
whistleblower law, Woodwell said."); see also R. at 001277-1278. 
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The Agency relies exclusively on Utah Admin. Code Rl 64-31-1 for its authority 
to impose investor losses on Phillips. 13 R164-31-1 is an Agency rule that provides the 
factors the Agency should consider in setting the amount of the fine within the limitations 
on the fine set by statute. Among other factors, it is appropriate for the Agency to 
consider "harm to other persons, including the amount of investor loses" when 
determining whether to impose the maximum fine of$10,000 per violation of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Admin. Code R164-31-l(b). If the Division wished 
to seek restitution against Phillips, Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(2) requires the Division to 
pursue that remedy originally in the district court, where Phillips is provided with more 
extensive protections of his due process rights. Because the Agency improperly imposed 
restitution for which it has no statutory authority, the Initial Order imposes an unlawful 
civil penalty and must be vacated. 
C. The Agency's Fine Is Unconstitutionally Excessive under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
The Agency's fine far exceeds the statutory limit provided by§ 61-1-20 and bears 
no reasonable relationship to Phillips' conduct; therefore, the fine is 
unconstitutional and must be vacated. 14 The United States Constitution 
provides, "[ e ]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed .... " U.S. Const. amend. VIII.; see also, Utah Const. art. I, § 9. 
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines 
Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of forfeiture must 
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to 
punish." US. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,334 (1988) (citations omitted);. 
State v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, ,i 33, 8 P.3d 266, 
273 ( concluding that the "proper analysis as to whether a fine violates the 
13 R. at 001234; R. at 001277; see generally R. at 001090-1094. 
14 This Court reviews an Eighth Amendment challenge to an agency action for 
correctness. Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 18 (applying the "correction 
of error" standard to an Eighth Amendment challenge to an agency action). 
9 
Excessive Fines Clause is outlined in United States v. Bajakajian ... "). In 
the context of administrative agency actions, Utah courts apply Bajakajian 
by balancing a number of factors including the "gravity of the offense, the 
maximum fine that could be imposed, the extent of the unlawful activity, 
the amount of illegal gain in relation to the penalty, and the harm caused." 
Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 118 (citations omitted). 
The Agency's fine ( or monetary penalty, however denominated) is 
unconstitutionally ten times the amount a district court is permitted to apply under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(2). One of the "most important" Bajakajian factors is "Congress's 
judgment about the appropriate punishment for the owner's offense." US. v. Wagoner 
Cnty. Real Estate, 278 F .3d 1091, 1100 ( 10th Cir. 2002). Under the Eighth Amendment, 
"the maximum statutory fine is an appropriate benchmark of excessiveness." Dufries v. 
Greg Province, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143012, *33 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2010) 
(citations omitted); see also Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, 1~f 36-37 
(finding that a fine is unconstitutional when it is grossly disproportional to the maximum 
statutorily authorized penalty). The Agency purports that the fine is not unconstitutional 
because under the Agency's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20(1) "there is no 
limit" to the amount of fine the Agency can impose. R. at 001277. This cannot be the 
benchmark by which the court assesses the constitutionality of the fine. The Court 
should instead look to the prohibition under Section 61-1-20(2) of fines in excess of a 
statutory maximum of $10,000 per violation. In this case, at most, the Agency could 
impose a fine of $40,000 against Phillips, representing four violations of the Securities 
Act. The Agency imposed an unconstitutional excessive fine when it used its statutory 
authority to enter a "fine" under Section 61-1-20(1) to impose a monetary penalty of 
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$413,750.00 where a district court would be limited to a maximum penalty of$40,000. R. 
at 001107. 
Moreover, the Agency's fine is unconstitutionally excessive because it fails to 
reflect that Phillips received no monetary benefit from the alleged conduct and that the 
fine bears no relationship to similarly imposed penalties under the Uniform Securities 
Act. Under Bajakajian, a court must "'compare the amount of the forfeiture to the 
gravity of the defendant's offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense, it is unconstitutional."' State v. 
Real Property at 633 E. 640 N., 2000 UT 17, 114, 994 P.2d 1254 (quoting Bajakajian, 
524 U.S. at 331). This Court has held that under the Excessive Fines clause, a fine can be 
"grossly disproportional" when "compared to the monetary value ... gained by [the 
violator] participating in the prohibited activity." Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT 
App 261, 121. 
Assuming arguendo that the Agency is not statutorily limited in the amount of 
fines it can impose; the fine would be excessive given the conduct in this case. The 
Agency found that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that [Phillips] received any 
meaningful financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other reconsideration from 
the transactions involving the Persches and Reutlingers." R. at 001092. 15 The Agency 
15 In Brent Brown Dealerships, the administrative agency imposed a $135,000 
penalty. Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, ,I 21. This Court found that the 
fine was ''well within the limits of the Eighth Amendment" because of its relationship to ll 
the defendant's illegal gain. Id. Unlike, Brent Brown Dealerships, Phillips did not 
personally benefit from either the GIT transaction or the emerald deal. R. at 001092. In 
11 <if 
also found that there was no evidence that Phillips had a "history of previous violations." 
Id. Moreover, the amount of this fine is extreme in comparison to the statutory penalties 
authorized by other states under the Uniform Securities Act. See supra note 5. The 
Agency's fine is unconstitutional and must be vacated. 
II. THE AGENCY IMPROPERLY USED POST HOC RATIONALIZATIONS 
TO BOLSTER AN UNLAWFUL FINE. 
The Agency's attempt to bolster the deficient Initial Order in the Amended Order 
is improper post hoc rationalization and must be disregarded. "When reviewing an 
agency's interpretation of law, [this Court] review[ s] for correctness, granting little or no 
deference to an agency's determination." Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 
2009 UT 76, 113, 226 P.3d 719, 725 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Further, agency rules are reviewed "in the same manner as statutes, focusing first on the 
plain language of the rule." Id. (citations omitted). Utah Admin. Code R164-31-l(b)(l) 
provides that the Agency shall consider a number of factors in setting a fine, including: 
(a) the serious, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct 
constituting the violation; (b) the harm to other persons, including the 
amount of investor losses, resulting either directly or indirectly from the 
violation; ( c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other 
consideration received directly or indirectly by the person in connection 
with the violation ... 
In the Initial Order, the Commission failed to properly weigh the Rl 64-31-1 factors and 
relied exclusively on "investor losses" to assess the $315,000.00 portion of the civil 
penalty imposed. R. at 001107. The Department of Commerce recognized the 
fact, Phillips invested his own money into the emerald deal and lost every penny of his 
investment. See R. at 000949. 
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Commission's failure, finding that the Commission's order "does not reference the rule, 
nor does the Order address or discuss the other factors in Subsection Rl64-31-l(l)." See 
R. at 001281. The Department of Commerce nonetheless improperly affirmed the 
amount of the Commission's fine and then remanded to the Commission with instructions 
that the Commission articulate a legally sufficient basis under RI 64-31-1 ( 1) for the 
previously assessed fine. 16 
An agency's findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
raised. See Adams v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 821 P .2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991 ); Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis Cnty. Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 
347, ,i 7, 121 P.3d 39. Importantly, "post hoc rationalizations of the agency ... cannot 
serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action." Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. 
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (citations omitted). 17 Indeed, a "remand is not 
intended to be a mere bolstering of the (factfinder's] previous decision." State v. Hansen, Q 
857 P.2d 978,982 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("In so remanding, we do not intend that the new hearing be used 
16 (See id. at p. 20, ,i 27 (remanding "solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the 
Commission's thought process and analysis with respect to the Subsection R164-31-1 (1) 
factors.")). 
17 See also New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 704 
(10th Cir. 2009) ("In considering whether the agency took a 'hard look' [at information 
relevant to the decision], we consider only the agency's reasoning at the time of decision-
making, excluding post-hoc rationalization concocted by counsel in briefs or argument." 
(emphasis added)); Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(noting that an agency cannot supplement an administrative record "with post hoc 
rationalizations for its decision"). 
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simply to bolster the trial court's previous holding that Bimstein was entitled to 
restitution of$ 450.")). 
The Department of Commerce's remand to the Commission for a "mere 
bolstering" of a deficient order was improper. The Commission, as fact finder, is 
required to articulate sufficient facts in its order on which the Department of Commerce 
and this Court can evaluate the merits of the Commission's fine against Phillips. Here, 
the Commission's Amended Order improperly bolstered its previous deficient decision 
imposing a $413,750.00 fine instead of fully and properly evaluating the evidence before 
making a conclusion on remand. See generally R. at 001090-1094. 
The Department of Commerce asserts that the Amended Order was proper because 
the Executive· Director of the Department of Commerce has "reviewed numerous cases 
from the Commission and the Division" and therefore the Executive Director was able to 
conduct a "meaningful review" of the Commission's "stated findings" and "implied 
findings." R. at 001340 ( citations omitted). In doing so, the Department of Commerce 
incredibly purports to have the ability to read the Commission's mind, so to speak. The 
Department of Commerce can cite no regulatory or statutory authority for its ability to 
affirm the amount of a fine and order remand to bolster a deficient-unsupported order. 
(See id.) Accordingly, the Amended Order must be disregarded as improper post hoc 
rationalization. 
III. THE GIT TRANSACTION CLAIM IS TIME BARRED BY§ 61-1-21.1(1). 
Section 61-1-21.1 ( 1) of the Securities Act provides that"[ n ]o indictment or 
information may be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five 
14 
years after the alleged violation." In this case, the Division issued the Order to Show 
Cause against Phillips on January 3, 2012, nearly six months after the statute of 
limitations had expired for the GIT transaction. 18 Therefore, the Division's claim against 
Phillips and the fine associated with the GIT transaction are barred by§ 61-1-21.1(1). 
The Agency's response to Phillips' statute of limitations argument is that no statute of 
limitations whatsoever applies to administrative actions brought by the Division. R. at 
001102; R. at 001271. Section 61-1-21.1(1) limits any authority exercised by the 
Division under the Securities Act for three reasons. First, by examining the plain 
language of§ 61-1-21.1(1), its placement within the Securities Act, and analogous 
federal statutes, it is plain that the legislature intended to bind the Division to a five year 
statute of limitations regardless of the forum chosen. Second, without.imposing the same 
statute of limitations in the administrative context as in the judicial context, the Court 
would render an entire section of the Securities Act superfluous. Finally, the Agency 
must be bound to § 61-1-21.1 ( 1) in order to prote~t the important public policy goals 
furthered by a statute of limitations. 
18 The GIT transaction occurred in July 2006. See R. at 001097. The Order to Show 
Cause, dated January 3, 2012, occurred 5 years and 6 months following the GIT 
transaction. See generally R. at 000486-497. Like its federal counterpart, the Utah statute 
is not a discovery statute. $ee Gabelli v. S.E.C., 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1223 (2013). The 
statute of limitations began to run against the Division at the moment of the Persches' Gi 
invested in the GIT transaction and therefore, the GIT transaction is time barred by § 61-
1-21.1 ( l ). 
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A. Section 61-1-21.1 Prevents the Division from Forum Shopping Based 
on the Age of the Underlying Conduct. 
A "civil complaint" encompasses any authority exercised by the Division under 
the Securities Act. The "'primary goal in construing statutory language is to give effect 
to the true intent and purpose of the legislature."' State v. Houston, 2011 UT App 350, 
ljj 12,263 PJd 1226 (quoting Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, ljj 12, 226 P.3d 743). The 
first step in statutory interpretation is to examine the "plain language of the statute itself." 
State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 'ii 8, 52 P.3d 1276, 1278 (citations omitted). "Absent a 
legislative grant of discretion, this [C]ourt reviews an agency's interpretation of its 
organic statute for correctness, granting no deference to the agency's interpretation." LPI 
Serv. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, 215 P.3d 135, ljj 7. 
The plain language of§ 61-1-21.1(1) is clear: "No indictment or information may 
be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the 
alleged violation." (emphasis added). 19 Section 61-1-21.1(1) limits the Division's 
authority exercised "under this chapter," meaning the Securities Act. In other words, any 
authority granted to the Division under the Securities Act is bound by§ 61-1-21.1(1). As 
described above, to enforce an order entered by the Agency, the Division must file an 
action in district court pursuant to§ 61-1-20(2)(a). See supra. Furthermore, the 
19 In Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate ofDep't of Business Regulations, 790 P.2d 102, 105 
(Utah 1990), ~e court held that "[i]n absence of specific legislative authority, civil 
statutes of limitations are inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings." Here, 
as will be described below, a "civil complaint" encompasses any authority exercised by 
the Division under the Securities Act. Additionally, Rogers should be distinguished in 
this matter because the case against Phillips is not a disciplinary proceeding. Phillips is 
not a regulated professional. He is an Oregon resident sued by the Agency for violations 
of the Act. 
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Division's action against Phillips is synonymous with a "civil complaint." The Order to 
Show Cause included a statement of jurisdiction, an identification of the parties, general 
allegations, causes of action, and the relief sought by the Division. See generally R. at 
000486-497. 
In 3M Co. (Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing) v. Browner·, 17 F.3d 1453, 1459 
(D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. Circuit held that a five year statute of limitations barred part of 
the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") enforcement action against the 
defendant, 3M. The EPA filed an administrative complaint in 1988 seeking civil 
penalties. Id. at 1455. 3M argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2462's five year statute of limitations (I;) 
applied and therefore, the EPA was barred from asserting a fine for any conduct outside 
the statutory period. Id. The EPA's ALJ ruled that no statute of limitations applied 
because § 2462 only applied to judicial proceedings, not the civil penalty enforcement 
action brought by the EPA. Id. Section 2462 reads: 
[A]n action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained 
unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first 
accrued .... 
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (Lexis 2015). The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the EPA's ALJ, finding 
that § 2462 applies regardless of whether the "penalty is a proceeding started in a court or 
in an agency." Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457. The court interpreted§ 2462's "action, suit or 
proceeding" to "readily fit[]" the description of an agency action. Id. The court noted 
that "[ c ]ivil penalty proceedings under [the Act] emulate judicial proceedings: a 
complaint is brought, the defendant answers, motions and affidavits are filed, depositions 
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are taken, other discovery pursued, a hearing is held, evidence is introduced, findings are 
rendered and an order assessing a civil penalty is issued." Id. at 1456. The court 
concluded that there is "there is no discernible rationale for applying § 2462 when the 
penalty action or proceeding is brought in a court, but not when it is brought in an 
administrative agency." Id. at 1457. The court recognized that the concerns in either 
context are the same. A statute of limitations prevents evidence from being lost or 
forgotten while ensuring a defendant has "'settled expectations"' in either the judicial or 
administrative context. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 
(1980)). 
Just like Browner, there is "no discernible rationale" for applying§ 61-1-21.1(1) 
any differently in the administrative enforcement action against an unlicensed person 
than in the district court. A "civil complaint filed under this chapter" includes any 
authority exercised by the Division under the Securities Act. An action brought by the 
Division before the Agency is the functional equivalent of a civil court proceeding: a 
complaint was filed against a non-licensed individual who is not a resident of Utah, 
answers, motions, and pleadings were received, a hearing was held, and findings fact and 
conclusions oflaw were issued by the Agency. See generally Utah Admin. Code R151-
4; R. at 000486; R. at 001095. As in Browner, a "civil complaint" encompasses an 
administrative action just like "an action, suit or proceeding" is akin to an administrative 
action. Further, whether the Division acts before the Agency or the district court, the 
concerns are the same. Section 61-1-21.1(1) ensures evidence isn't lost or forgotten 
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while giving Phillips "settled expectations" in either context. The GIT claim against 
Phillips must be vacated. 
B. Section§ 61-1-21.1(1) Prevents the Division from Doing an End-Run 
around the District Court Through an Administrative Enforcement 
Proceeding. 
Ignoring the limitations of§§ 61-1-20 and 61-1-21.1, would create the result of 
providing the Division an incentive to bypass the important due process protections of the 
district court proceedings· through an administrative enforcement action. Statutes are to 
be construed to avoid absurd results or results that would render portions of the statute 
'"superfluous or inoperable."' Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 111 
( citations omitted); Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P 'ship, 2011 UT 50, 1 26, 267 
P.3d 863. "[T]he Securities Act provides concurrent jurisdiction in the district court and 
the Division director to enforce the Securities Act." Mack, 2009 UT 47,134. 
The remedies in the district court are broader than the administrative enforcement 
action remedies, allowing the Division to utilize which forum that is most appropriate 
based on the underlying conduct in the case-more egregious conduct will require a 
broader order thus requiring the Division to exercise its power in the district court. If the 
Division has no time bar in the administrative context, it is free to bring claims many 
years after the alleged conduct by simply bypassing the district court and initiating an 
administrative enforcement action. This reading of the Securities Act, coupled with the 
Agency's belief that it can impose unlimited fines, see supra, would ensure that the 
• 
• 
district court avenue is rarely, if ever, utilized by the Division. This Court should impose • 
19 (i) 
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§ 61-1-21.1(1) regardless of the forum chosen by the agency and vacate the untimely GIT 
claim against Phillips. 
C. The Agency's Position Is Contrary to Utah's Public Policy. 
Section 61-1-21.1 must apply to the Division, regardless of the forum chosen, to 
further this state's important public policy goals of limiting stale claims. As Justice 
Marshall famously admonished, it '"would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws' 
if actions for penalties could 'be brought at any distance of time."' Gabelli v. S.E. C., 133 
S. Ct. 1216, 1218 (2013) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336,342 (1805)). "Statutes of 
limitations are not designed exclusively for the benefit of individuals but are also for the 
public good." Hirt/er v. Hirt/er, 566 P .2d 1231 (Utah 1977). Statutes oflimitations 
prevent the "revival and enforcement of stale demands" which may be difficult to defend 
"because of lapse of time, fading of memory, and possible loss of documents." Id. 
The statutory language found in§ 61-1-21.1(1) represents a give and take between 
the compelling policy choices underlying the Securities Act. Indeed, the plain language 
of the Securities Act represents a compromise between allowing the Division sufficient 
time to fully investigate and bring claims against potential defendants, while still 
providing predictability for those individuals and potential defendants who conduct 
business in Utah. 20 In establishing a five year statute of limitations, the legislature 
provides predictability, which in turn promotes commerce within the state and 
encourages individuals to travel and conduct business in Utah. Additionally, "[ u ]nlike 
20 By the Division's logic, a person could have committed securities fraud in 1970 and 
still fall within the scope of the Division's administrative authority-long after memories 
have faded and evidence has been lost or destroyed. 
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the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the [Division's] very purpose is to 
root it out, and it has many legal tools at hand to aid in that pursuit." Gabelli, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1222. Therefore,§ 61-1-21.1(1) does not hinder the Division's mission under the 
Securities Act. 
Moreover, administrative proceedings by their very nature give a defendant less 
procedural protections. The question the Agency's position raises is why the legislature 
would provide a defendant with less protection in a forum where a defendant already 
lacks all of the procedural safeguards of a judicial proceeding. The answer is that the 
legislature never intended to write the Division a discretionary blank check to bring 
claims whenever it pleased. Rather, the Division is bound by § 61-1-21.1 ( 1) and is 
required to bring claims, regardless of forum chosen, within five years of the alleged 
violation. Therefore, the GIT transaction claim against Phillips must be dismissed and 
the monetary penalty should be reduced accordingly. 
IV. THE AGENCY UNLAWFULLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
SUPPORTING THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE TO PHILLIPS. 
The Agency bears the burden of justifying the fine or civil penalty levied against 
Phillips, including the burden to prove any investor losses that it uses to justify the fine or 
civil penalty. The Agency improperly shifted this burden to Phillips and calculated the 
fine based on investor losses without sufficient proof of those losses. 
It is undisputed that the Perches took 21 barrels of the "emeralds" purchased in the 
emerald deal with investor funds. R. at 001106. The Agency failed to evaluate whether, 
given the Persches receipt and retention of the "emeralds" purchased with investor funds, 
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the Pershes actually suffered a loss from the transaction. When challenged by Phillips 
with the fact that the losses were undefined, even by an expert initially hired by the 
Agency itself (See R. at 001029, 1222-1223), the Agency improperly shifted the burden 
to disprove investor loss to Phillips. It characterized the Perches 21 barrels of "emeralds'' 
as an offset that Phillips failed to prove. The Agency found, "While an offset potentially 
might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the Commission has the burden to 
calculate it." R. at 001107. 
A. The Agency Bears the Burden of Proof. 
The Agency bears the burden of proof in an action brought in its administrative 
adjudication process. By agency rule, "The Department has the burden of proof in a 
proceeding initiated by a notice of agency action." Utah Admin. Code Rl51-4-709(1). 
The Agency was required to bear the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Phillips has violated the Securities Act and justify the fine. See Utah 
Admin. Code R151-4-709(1); Utah Admin. Code R151-4-708; see generally Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-20. 
The value of the gems in the possession of the Persches' is important in this matter 
because the Agency relied heavily on investor loss to determine the fine imposed on 
Phillips. R. at 001107. The key to determining the appropriate amount of investor loss is 
the value of the "emeralds" in the Persches' possession. In shifting the Division's burden 
to Phillips to prove the value of the "emeralds", the Agency committed a reversible error. 
See Harrington v. Office of Miss. Secy. of State, 129 So. 3d 153, 173-75 (Miss. 2013) 
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(reversing a division's fine because the division failed to provide "evidence regarding the 
specific number of investors and the violations committed against each"). 
B. Retroactively Applying a New Reading of the Statute Would be 
Improper. 
Alternatively, even if the Agency could, for the first time, articulate a new rule 
that a respondent bears the burden to establish the value of an offset, that newly 
articulated burden cannot apply retroactively to Phillips. The Agency's new burden 
shifting rule would affect Phillips' substantive rights, creating an undue burden on 
Phillips resulting in a substantial injustice. See, e.g., Monarrez v. Utah DOT, 2014 UT 
App 219, ,I 30,335 P.3d 913 (noting that a ruling of a court may apply prospectively 
"when retroactive application will result in 'substantial injustice."' ( citations omitted)); 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n of Utah, 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993) 
('" When we conclude that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law 
or that the retroactive application of the new law may otherwise create an undue burden, 
th_e court may order that a decision apply only prospectively."' ( citations omitted)). 
In this case, Phillips made strategic decisions for his defense based on the clearly 
articulated rule that "the department has the burden of proof in a proceeding initiated by a @ 
notice of agency action." Utah Admin. Code Rl 51-4-709( 1 ). Phillips justifiably relied 
on this rule given the clear language in the regulation and the lack of any alternative 
burden-shifting rule in the· statutes and regulations governing this matter. See id. (See 
also R. at 001106-1107 (lacking any statutory cite for the notion- that Phillips bears the 




the Agency to announce a new burden-shifting requirement that substantively affects 
Phillips' rights and then apply it retroactively. 
V. PHILLIPS' DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
A. Phillips' Appeal of the Last Final Agency Action Incorporates All Prior 
Agency Orders. 
The Agency order dated June 5, 2015 held that Phillips waived most of the issues 
raised in this appeal because he did not file his judicial appeal immediately after the 
January 9, 2015 order in which the Agency affirmed the amount of the monetary penalty 
but remanded for further explanation of the justification for the monetary penalty. R. at 
001332-1343. The agency's finding that Phillips waived his appellate rights is simply 
legally incorrect. An Agency may dispose of'" discrete issues in one order while leaving 
other issues for later orders,"' but a final agency action remains appealable until the "' last 
day to appeal the last final agency action in the case."' Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2000 UT 
40, ilil 13, 16 (quoting Barker, 970 P.2d at 706) (emphasis in Union Pac. R.R. Co.). 
Under Barker v. Utah PSC, 970 P .2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998) and Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT 40, ,r 16, 999 P .2d 17, Phillips was permitted to wait 
until the last day to appeal the "last final agency action" before seeking judicial review. 
Id. ( emphasis in Union Pac. R.R. Co.). The Supreme Court's approach allows petitioners 
to await the orderly conclusion of agency decision-making to appeal and obtain orderly 
and efficient judicial review. 
Phillips properly waited to file a judicial appeal until after the Department of 
Commerce's partial remand was resolved and the Department of Commerce issued its 
24 
order reviewing the Amended Order of the Utah Securities Commission on June 5, 2015. 
See Utah Rules of App. Proc. R. 14(a); Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-401(3)(a). He was not 
required to bring multiple requests for judicial review of the same agency action simply 
to avoid waiving legal arguments he had already preserved in his successive 
administrative appeals to the Utah Department of Commerce. 
B. The Order of the Department of Commerce Making a Partial Remand 
Was Not a Final Agency Action Subject to Judicial Appeal. 
Furthermore, it would have been error for Phillips to file an appeal from the Utah 
Department of Commerce's January 9, 2015 order that remanded the factors justifying 
the fine to the Utah Securities Commission for further explanation, because that order 
was not a final agency action. The Court has jurisdiction to review "final agency actions" 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-4-40 I. To 
establish finality, this Court must answer the following three part test in the affirmative: 
( 1) Has administrative decision-making reached a stage where judicial 
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?; (2) Have rights 
or obligations been determined or will legal consequences flow from the 
agency action?; and (3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not 
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to 
subsequent agency action? 
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT 40, ,I 16, 999 P.2d 17; see 
Heber Light & Power Co., 2010 UT 27, 17. 
Applying these factors, an immediate appeal of the Agency's January 9th remand 
was improper because it would have disrupted judicial review where, as the Agency 
admits, the purpose of its remand was to "facilitate judicial review." R. at 001340. An 
agency action is not final when an immediate appeal would "'disrupt the orderly process 
25 
of adjudication." Courts have found that the orderly process of adjudication is disrupted 
when "judicial review" takes place while [ the agency] was evaluating" issues presented 
in an agency order. See Pentskiff Interpreting Servs. v. Dep 't of Health, 2013 UT App 
157, 1, 6-7, 305 P .3d 218 ( citations omitted). The justification of the monetary levied 
against Phillips was still at issue, making orderly appeal of that issue impossible at that 
time. 
Also, the Agency's January 9th remand was "preliminary" because it left more 
decision-making for the Agency to complete. An order that is "preliminary, preparatory, 
procedural, or intermediate" does not constitute final agency action. Barker, 970 P .2d at 
706. Agency orders that (1) "remand[] the·case for further proceedings," (2) "convert[] 
informal proceedings into formal [proceedings], or (3) "deny[] motions to dismiss" are 
not final agency actions. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2000 UT 40, 121 ( quoting Barker, 970 
P.2d at 706) (citing cases). Although this-list is non-exhaustive, it "demonstrates what 
kinds of orders are preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate." Id. The 
January 9th order was "preliminary" and "preparatory" because the Department of 
Commerce remanded the case to the Commission for "further proceedings." (First Order, 
at 20). Although the Agency purports that the remand was for the sole purpose of 
obtaining a more detailed discussion of the R164-31-1 factors, the remand, as described 
above, relates to a crucial issue that permeates over the entire case. R. at 001282. 
Therefore, Phillips properly waited for the final disposition of the Agency on June 5, 
2015, before seeking judicial review. 
26 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
In sum, based on the foregoing, the Court should find that the Agency acted 
unlawfully when it imposed the monetary penalty on Phillips. Phillips requests that the 
Court vacate the monetary penalty and remand to the Agency with instructions limiting 
the civil penalties and fines that may be imposed. The Court has the authority to grant 
relief in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403 and 63G-4-404. 
DATED this~ ay off{weclzr201s. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
~ff)~ 
Maria E. Windham 
Beth Ranschau 
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Di vision of Securities 
Utab Department of Commerce 
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Box 146760 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6760 
Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
FAX: (80 I )530-6980 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
JACK PHILLIPS, 
JAMES D. ELLIOTT, 
Respondents. 
ORDER TO s:aow CAUSE 
Docket No.~fiifl.000} 
Docket No.~ 
It appears to the Director of the Utah Division of Securities (Director) thatJack Phillips and 
James D. Elliott have engaged in acts and practices that violate the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, et seq. (the Act). Those acts are more fully described herein. Based upon 
infonnation discovered in the course of the Utah Division of Securities' (Division) investigation of 
this matter, the Director issues this Order to Show Cause in accordance with the provisions of§ 61-
1-20(1) of the Act. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction over Respondents and the subject matter is appropriate be.cause the Division 
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alleges that they vio1ated § 6 l -1-1 (securities fraud) of the Act while engaged in the offer 
and sale of securities in or from Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE RESPONDENTS 
2. Jack Phillips (Phillips} was, at all relevant times, a resident of the State of Oregon. Phillips 
has never been licensed in the securities industry in any capacity. 
3. James D. Elliott (Elliott) was, at all relevant times, a resident of the State of Tennessee. 
Elliott has never been licensed in the securities industry in any capacity. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. From January 2007 to March 2007, Respondents offered and sold investment conLracts to 
investors, in or from Utah, and collected at least $330,000. 
5. Investment contracts are securities under the Act. 
6. Respondents made material misstatements and omissions in connection with the offer and 
sale of securities to the investors below. 
7. Investors lost all $330,000 of their principal. 
INVESTORS B.P. AND G.P. ffiUSBAND AND WIFE) 
8. B.P. and O.P. met Phillips through a mutual friend. At all relevant times., B.P. and O.P. lived 
in Sall Lake Cow1ty, Utah. 
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9. In February 2005, Phillips began discussing investment opportunities in Guardian 
International Travel (GIT) with B.P. via telephone. 




(1) Investors could make .five times the value of their initial investment by receiving 
"condo cards,, redeemable at travel destinations with a face value of three limes what 
an investor provided GIT; or 
(2) Investors would receive five times their initial investment in eighteen months because 
their funds were used in FOREX trading. 
In or about July 2006, B.P. and G.P. invested $25,000 in GIT through Phillips. B.P. and G.P. 
received several condo cards that never worked with any travel establishment and received 
.$10,000 to $12,000 in return from GIT. 
On or about December 17, 2006, Phillips flew to Salt Lake City~ Utah to meet with B.P. to 
discuss an investment opportunity in imported emeralds. 
During the meeting, Phmips made the following statements about an investment with 
Phillips: 
a. The investment would result in tripling the investment funds in ninety days; 
b. The deal could subsequently include diamonds and rubies; 
C. It was Phillips' "deal" because he was an "insurance guy,, who would make sure the 
deal was insured and he decided who got in; 
3 
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d. The transaction involved an emerald mining operation in Brazil that needed to expo11 
the emeraJds; 
e. A reverend with a mission in Brazil had fifteen years of experience in exporting 
emeralds; 
f. The reverend needed to export the emeralds as soon as possible; 
g. There was a buyer in the United States already lined up to buy the emeralds; 
h. B.P. and G.P.'s money would be held in escrow as proof of funds and would never 
leave the country; 
i. The worst case scenario would be that B.P. and G.P. only ge1 their principal back; 
J, B.P. and G.P. would have no responsibilities in the investment; 
k. Investors could reinvest every thirty days; 
1. Phi1lips was bringing B.P. into the investment as a favor to B.P. for being among a 
select number offrjends and because he had invested in GIT; and 
m. Elliott would be involved in the transaction and Phillips bad done business with 
Elliott for some time. 
14. On or about January 4, 2007) Phillips returned to Salt Lake City, Utah with Elliott to meet 
with B.P. 
15. During the meeting Elliott presented the same offer and made the following statements: 
a. The investme11t was guaranteed; 
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B.P. would triple bis money in ninety days and the transaction was insured; 
Elliott knew the reverend involved in the export of emeralds; 
This offer was only available to a select few and Phillips had spoken very highly of 
B.P. and G.P.; 
e. Elliott and Phillips had been doing business together for some time; 
f. Because B.P. and G.P. invested in GIT, they were being offered this new investment; 
g. The buyer for the emeralds was already in place; 
h. Investors' funds would be used as proofof :funds and would never leave the country; 
1. Investors could reinvest every thirty days; and 
J · GIT had additional opportunities to grow wealth, such as a rubber tree company and a 
concrete business. 
Based on Phillips' and Elliott's statements, B.P. and G.P. invested$30,000 with Phillips and 
EWott. On or about January 26, 2007, B.P. and G.P. wired $30,000 to an account for 
Marrical Music, LLC l. 
SECOND INVESTMENT 
After B.P. and G.P.'s initial investmenl, Phillips advised B.P. to sell bis business quickly, 
even if it sold it at a 50% loss, because B.P. would more than make that money back in the 
1 Marrical Music, LLC is owned by Elliott's wife. They both have signatory authority over the account along with 
other family members of Elliott. 
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emerald transaction. 
18. B.P. sold his business on February l 0, 2007 intending Lo invest the proceeds with Phillips 
and Elliott. 
19. On or about February 14, 2007, B.P. invested $270,000 wilh Respondents by wiring the 
funds to a trust account set up by an attorney named Paul E. Emerson (Emerson). 
20. In February 20081 after many excuses for delays in payments, B.P. tracked down the 
"emeralds" in Georgia and transported them back to Utah. 
21. B.P. had them appraised and it was detennined that they were not emeralds, but industrial 
grade cul glass. 
22. B.P. and G.P. never received any payments from Phillips or Elliott and are owed $300,000 in 
principal alone. 
23. Bank records show B.P. and G.P!s funds were used by Respondents in the following 
manner: 
a. $150,000 paid to First Clearing? LLC; 
b. $106,000 transferred to Emerson's personal account; 
c. $14,000 paid to Gail Cato; 
d. $11,000 cashed; 
e. $8,000 paid to Elliott; 
f. $6,790 cashed with a memo for "Carn; 
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g. $2,181 paid to Mary E. Elliott; 
b. $600 paid to Jim Duncan; and 
t. $1,429 paid to miscellaneous expenses such as utilities, groceries, and liquor stores. 
INVESTORS P.R. AND S.R. lHUSBAND AND WIFE) 
24. P.R. and S.R. met Phillips through a mutual friend. At all relevant times, P.R and S.R. lived 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
25. In December 2006, Phillips began discussing investment opportunities in GIT with P .Rand 
S.R. During this same month, P.R. and S.R. invested $30,000 in GIT. 
26. On or about January 17, 2007, Phillips and Elliott discussed a new invesbnent opportunity 









The investment would result in tripling the investment funds in ninety days; 
The transaction involved an emerald mining operation in Brazjl that needed to export 
the emeralds; 
Investor funds would be sent to Elliott; and 
P.R. and S.R. would already be millionaires. 
During the meeting, Elliott made the following statements about the new investment: 
a. The investment would result in tripling the investment funds in ninety days; 
7 
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b. The investment had no risk; 
c. They already had prior investors; 
d. They were looking for buyers for the emeralds; and 
e. Money couJd be refovested in diamonds and rubies. 
29. Based on Phillips' and Elliott's statements, P.R. and S.R. invested $30,000 with Phillips and 
Elliott in the following manner: 
a. On or about February 27, 2007, P.R. and S.R. mailed Elliott a cashier's check of 
$7,500; 
b. OnoraboutFebruary27, 2007, P.R. and S.R. mailed Elliottasecondcashier'scheck 
of $7,500; 
c. On or about March 5, 2007, P.R. and S.R. mailed Elliott a cashier's check of$6,000; 
and 
d. On or about March 5, 2007, P.R. aud S.R. mailed Elliott a cashier's check of$9,000. 
30. On or about November 19> 2007, S.R. sent an email to Respondents requesting her principal 
retun1ed. 
31. P.R. and S.R. never received any payments from Pbill~s or Elliott and are owed .$30,000 in 
principal alone. 
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The Division incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 31. 
The investment opportunities offered and sold by Respondents are securities under§ 61-1-13 
of the Act. 
In connection with the offer and sale of a security to the investors, Respondents, directly or 






The investment funds would be held as a proof of funds only and would not be used, 
when in fact, Elliott used funds to pay other businesses, individuals, and personal 
expenses; 
The investment was guaranteed, when in fact, Respondents had no reasonable basis 
for making such a statement; 
The investment held no risk, when in fact, Respondents had no reasonable basis for 
making such a statement; 
The investment was insured, when in fact, Respondents never provided any proof of 
insurance; and 
The investment would be in emeralds., when in fact, the cargo was industrial grade 
cut glass. 
In connection with the offer and sale of a security to the investors, Respondents, directly or 
indirectly, failed to disclose material infonnation, including, but not limited to, the following, 
9 
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which was necessary in order to make statements made nol misJeading: 
a. The identity of the emeralds buyer; 
b. Other jndividua]s would have signatory authority over the account in which the 
investment funds would be deposited; 
c. Elliott had exercised W1authorized control over another investor's funds; 
d. Some or all of the information typically provided in an offering circular or 
prospectus regarding Phillips and Elliott, such as: 
1. Financial statements; 
ii. Risk factors; 
iii. The involvement of Phillips and Elliott in legal proceedings; 
iv. The number of investors; 
v. The amount of money needed to be raised; 
vi. TI1e amount of money actually raised; 
vii. Suitability factors for the inve51ment; 
viii. Nature of competition; 
ix. Whether the investmen?-was a registered security or exempt from registration; 
and 
X. Whether Respondents were licensed to sell securities. 
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The Director, pursuant to § 61-1-20 of the Act, hereby orders Respondents to appear at a 
formal hearing to be conducted in accordance with Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-202, -204 through -208, 
and held before the Utah Division of Securities. The hearing will occur on Wednesday, February 1, 
2012, at 9:00 a.m., at the office of the Utah Division of Secwities, located in the Heber Wells 
Bui I ding, 160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. The purpose of the hearing is to 
establish a scheduling order and address any preliminary matters. If Respondents fail to file an 
answer and appear at the hearing, the Division of Securities may hold Respondents in default, and a 
fine may be imposed in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-209. In lieu of default, the 
Division may decide to proceed with the hearing Wlder § 630~4-208. At the hearing, Respondents 




Why Respondents should not be found to have engaged in the violations alleged by 
the Division in th.is Order to Show Cause; 
Why Respondents should not be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in any 
further conduct in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-1, or any other section of the 
Act; 
Why Respondents should not be barred from (i) associating with any broker-dealer 
or investment adviser licensed in Utah; (ii) acting as an agent for any issuer 
soliciting investor funds in Utah, and (iii) from being licensed in any capacity in the 
securities industry in Utah; and 
11 
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d. Why Respondents should not be ordered to pay to the Division a fine amount to be 
determined by stipulation or by the presiding officer after a hearing in accordance 
with the provisions of Utah Admin. Rule Rl64-31-1, which may be reduced by 
restitution paid to the investors. 
DATED thi~ c21 day of Uu:nikV: , 2011. 
Approved: 
D. SCOTT DA VIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
D.W. 
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Division of Securities 
Utah Department ef Commerce 
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Box 146760 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6760 
Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
FAX:(801)530-6980 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
JACK PHILLIPS, 
JAMES 'D. ELLIOTT, 
NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION 
Docket No. \\1).. fl-@l 
Docket No.~ 
Respondents. 
THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES TO THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS: 
You are he-re by notified that agency action in the form of an adjudicative proceeding has been 
commenced against you by the Utah Division of Securities (Division). The adjudicative proceeding 
is to be formal and will be conducted according lo statute and rule. See Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-
201 and 630-4-204 through -209; ~~Utah Admin. Code RlSl-4-101 1 el seq, The facts on 
which this action is based are set forth in the accompanying Order to Show Cause. The legal 
authority under which this formal adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained is Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-20. You may be represented by counsel or you may represent you.rselfin lhis proceeding. Utah 
Admin. Code R151-4-110. 
You must file a written response with the Division within thirty (30) days of the mailing date 
of this Notice. Your response must be in writing and signed by you or your representative. Your 
UT. Div of Securftles 




response must include the file number and name of the adjudicative proceeding: your version of the 
facts, a statement of what relief you seek, and a statement summarizing why the relief you seek 
should be granted. Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-204() ). In addition, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
630-4-204(3): the presiding officer reqwres that your response: 
(a) admit or deny the allegations in each numbered paragraph of the Order to Show 
Cause, inc]uding a detailed explanation for any response other than an W1qualified 
admission. Al1egations in the Order to Show Cause not specifically denied are 
deemed admitted; 
(b) identify any additional facts or documents which you assert are relevant in 1ightofthe 
allegations made; and 
(c) state in short and plain tenns your defenses to each allegation in the Order to Show 
Cause, including affomative defenses, that were applicable at the time of the conduct 
(including exemptions or exceptions contained within the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act). 
Your response, and any future pleadings or filings that should be part of the official files in 
this matter, should be sent to the following: 
Signed originals to: 
Administrative Court Clerk 
c/o Julie Price 
Ulah Division of Securities 
160 E. 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Box 146760 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114:-6760 
(80 l) 530-6600 
A copy to: 
D. Scott Davis 
Assistant Attorney General 
Ctah Division of Securities 
160 East 300 SouthJ 5•h Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
(801) 366-0358 
An initial hearing in this matter is set for February l, 2012 al the Division of Securities, 2nd 
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Floor, 160 E. 300 S., SaJt Lake City, Utah, at 9:00 A.M. The purpose of the initial hearing is to enter 
a scheduling order addressing discovery= disclosure, and other deadlines, including pre-hearing 
motions, and to set a hearing date to adjudicate the matter alleged in the Order to Show Cause. 
If you fail to fi]e a response, as described above, or fail to appear at any hearing that is set, the 
presiding officer may enter a default order against you without any further notice. Utah Code Ann. § 
630-4-209; Utah Adm.in. Code R1 SI -4-710(2), After issuing the default order, the presiding officer 
may grant the relief sought against you in the Order to Show Cause, and will conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without your participation and will 
determine all issues in the proceedmg. Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-209(4). In the alternative, the 
Division may proceed with a hearing under§ 63G-4-208. 
The Administrative Law Judge will be Angela Hendricks, Utah Department of Commerce! 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 146701, Salt Lake City~ UT 84114-6701, telephone (801) 530-6035. 
This adjudicative proceeding will be heard by Ms, Hendricks and the Utah Securities Commission. 
You may appear and be heard and present evidence on your behalf at any such hearings. 
You may attempt to negotiate a settlement of the matter without filing a response or 
proceeding to hearing. To do so, please contact the Utah Attorney General's Office. Questions 
regarding the Order to Show Cause should be directed to D. Scott Davis, Assistant Attorney General, 
160 E. 300 South, 5th Floor, Box 140872, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872, Tel. No. (801) 366-0358. 
Dated thiso? f day of ~rAt'r' 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the hl:0.._ day ofun~1ill~I '20111., I mailed} by certified mail, a true 
and correct copy of the Notice of Agency =;-~der to Show Cause to: 
Jack Phi llips 
39373 Lacomb Dr. 
Lebanon, OR 97355 
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DlVISION OF SECURITIES 
KEITH WOODWELL, DIRECTOR 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
P.O. BOX 146741 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT AH 84114-67 l 1 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UT AH 
1 ; 












Mark Pugsley and Maria Heckel for Respondent. 
Paul Amann and Keith Woodwell for the Divisjon of Securities. 
COMMISSION MEMBERS: 




BY THE UTAH SECURJTrES COMMISSION: 
On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Securities (Division) brought allegations 
~gainst Jack Phillips ("Respondent") through a Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show 
Cause. This matter was heard by four members of the Utah Securities Commission 
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("Commission") in a hearing held March 27, 2014 and Apri] 21, 2014. The Commission has 
considered and weighed the admitted evidence according to the applicable standard of proof, that 
being a preponderance of the evidence, and now enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
l . Respondent is a resident of Oregon. 
2. Respondent has never been licensed to sell securities. 
3. Respondent has a criminal record. On or about October 29, 2002, Respondent was 
convicted of unlawful gambling in the first degree (case number 00112764, Linn County 
Circuit Court, State of Oregon). 
4. At relevant times, Respondent has been involved in a multi-level marketing company 
called Guardian Internationa] Travel ("GJT"). 
5. Elliott James ("James") was Respondent's sponsor and a vice president at GJT. 
6. Respondent sold the GIT opportunity and was paid commissions for doing so. 
Respondent was extremely successfully in marketing GlT and was rewarded for his 
success through bonuses and gifts. 
7. Respondent was the first and primary source of infom1ation for Bi11 and Gidgette Persch 
(''the Persches) and for Paul and Sherry Reutlinger ("the Reutlingers") regarding GIT. 
8. In soliciting the Persches to participate in GIT, Respondent assured them that they did not 
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return. In addition, Respondent 
made _the following assurances and representations: 
a. The investments would be used for FOREX trading. 1 
1 The Commission takes notice that FOREX trading, also known as the foreign exchange marker, is a global 
decentralized market for the trading of currencies. 
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b. Any investment would generate a five-fold return within 18 months. 
9. ln soliciting the Persches to invest in GIT, Respondent omitted to disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for il1ega1 gambling. 
b. The risks involved in trading foreign currencies. 
c, The track record of GlT and its investors. 
d. Whether the GIT investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt 
from registration. 
e. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell securities or exempt from licensure. 
l 0. In or about July 2006, the Persches tendered $25,000 to GIT through Respondent. 
11. The Persches' investments were not used for FOREX trading. Whi1e the Persches 
received nominal payments for a time, they never made back their initial investments or 
realized any profits. 
12. In or about November 2006, James approached Phillips with a deal involving the 
purchase, importatjon, and sale of emeralds. 
13. Among other tl1ings, James told Respondent that James could arrange for the purchase 
and jmportation of emeralds, which would sell within 90 days for three times the value 
paid by an investor ("the emera)d dea1"). 
14. On or about November 14, 2006, Respondent invested in the emerald deal. 
15. Shortly thereafter, Respondent began soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to join a 
conference call in which James would invite them to invest in the emerald deal. This 
solicitation took place in Utah. 
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16. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to participate in the conference call, 
Respondent assured them that they would have no responsibility to operate the enterprise 
or manage the investment. In addition, Respondent made the following representations: 
a. The emeralds were gem-quality. 
b. There was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds. 
c. Investment capitaJ was needed solely to establish proof of funds; therefore, money 
tendered by investors would not leave the country, but would be held in an escrow 
accoW1t. 
d. An investor would make three times the investment amount within a maximum 
of90 days. 
e. There was no risk. The worst possible scenario would be a return of the initial 
investment. 
At hearing, Respondent urged that James made these representations to him, thus 
inducing him to invest1 and that he merely repeated the infonnation to those he solicited. 
The Commission did not find Respondent's testimony credible. 
17. In soliciting the Perscbes and Reutlingers to invest in the emerald deal, Respondent 
omitted to explain or disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
b. The ideotjty of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from James. 
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment. 
d. The number of investors. 
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised. 
f. SuitabiJ ity factors for the investment and investors. 
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g. The nature of any competition. 
h. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a security or 
exempt from registration; 
1. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell secutities or exempt from licensure. 
18. On or about January 26, 2007, Bill Persch invested $30,000 in the emerald deal. 
19. On or about February 14, 2007, Bil1 Persch invested an additional $270,000 in the 
emerald deal. 
20. Between approximately February 27, 2007 and March 5, 2007, the Reutlingers invested 
$30,000 in the emerald deal. 
21. The money tendered by the Persches and Reutiingers was not held in escrow. Some of it 
was used to purchase emeralds, but they were not gem-quality. Much ofit was used by 
James at his discretion. No buyer for the emeralds was in p]ace at any relevant time. The 
investors have not rea]ized any profits from the emerald deal. There was no credible or 
admissible evidence presenled that the Persches or Reutlingers would ever rea1ize any 
profits from the emerald deal. 
22. When the Persches and Reutlingers made their Febrnary and March 2007 investments, 
around 90 days had passed since Respondent's initial investment in the emerald deal. 
Respondent had not received a return on his investment. He did not infonn the Persches 
and Reutlingers of this delinquency before or shortly after the Persches and Reutlingers 
invested in the emerald deaJ. 
23. The emeralds purchased by James and his associates were shipped to the United States. 
Currently, at least some of the emeralds are in the custody of the Persches. There is 
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insufficient information or admissible evidence in the record from which to calculate or 
estimate the commercial value of the gems, if any. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l. Utah Code § 61-1-13(1 )( ee)(i)(K) provides that an investment contract is a security. Utah 
Code§ 61-1-13(l)(s}(ji)2 sets forth a four-part lest for determining whether an agreement 
under which money changes hands constitutes an investment contract. The test is as 
follows: 
a. An offeree furnishes initiaJ value to an offerer. 
b. A portion of the initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise. 
c. The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offerer's promises or 
representations that give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit 
of some kind over and above the initial value will accrue to the offeree as a result 
of the operation of the enterprise. 
d. The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical ~d actual control over 
the managerial decisions of the enterprise. 
2. As to the GIT investment. the Commission concludes that it was an investment contract 
and, therefore, was a security, as follows: 
2 The Commission notes that Utah Code § 61-1 et seq as in effect on March 16, 2007, did not include a definition of 
the tenn "inve.1tment contracL" However, the fundamental elements of the test have been in effect at all relevant 
times under the common law. Securities & Exchange Commission ,,. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 291 (1946), The 
Utah Legislature adopted the test into statute in 2009, with tile founh prong staling I.hat the offeree has no right to 
"practical or actual" control. The conjunction was changed to "and" in the 2011 Legislative Session. Thal linguislic 
change does not affect die analysis here. 
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a. The Persches furnished initial value as offerees when they bought into GIT. 
Where Respondent solicited the tender of this initial value, he was an offerer in 
the transaction.3 
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persches was subjected to the risks of 
GIT's use and management. 
c. The Persches were induced to buy into GIT by Respondent's promises and 
representations that they would receive a five-fold return on their investment 
within 18 months. A five-fold return constitutes a valuable benefit over and above 
the initial value t.endered. In addition, while the Persches were allowed Lo bring 
additional distributers into the GIT marketing system, they were assured that it 
was not necessary for them to do so in order to receive the promised return on 
their investments. Therefore, the return was premised on the operation of GIT as 
an enterprise, not on the work and contribution of the Persches. 
d. The Persches did not have any duty, obligation, or opportunity to participate in or 
control decisions made by GIT, whether as to trading foreign currencies or 
otheiwise. Therefore, they did not have practical or actual control over the 
managerial decisions of GIT. 
3. In concluding that the GIT investment was a security, the Commission has considered 
'Respondent's argument to th.e effect that multi-level marketing companies and securities 
are mutually exclusive. The Commission disagrees. A multi-level marketing company is 
a system for advertising, distributing, and selling something of value. If the offering that 
is advertised, distributed, and sold satisfies the statutory test for an investment contract, 
; Utah Code § 61-1-13( 1 )(bb)(ii) defines "offer" or "offer to sell" as including "an attempt or oll'er 10 dispose of, or 
solicitation of an offer to buy, a securny or interest in a security for value" (emphasis added). 
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then it is a security, at least on the facts before the Commission in this case. It is the 
nature of the offering that is sold-not the manner of sale or the ind1.1stry at issue-that 
delennines whether a security is at issue. Based on the specific facts at issue, a security 
was involved in the sale of the GIT investment opportunity to the Persches. 
4. The Commission has also considered Respondent's argument that the Persches' GIT 
transactions occurred more than five years prior to the date on which the order to show 
cause was issued in this administrative matter. The Commission has previously ruled that 
no stat\lte of I imitations applies.4 Regardless, Respondent argues that the age of the 
transaction should insulate him, in part if not in whole, from any liability regarding it. 
The Commission disagrees. 
S. The Division has discretion to prosecute any case, regardless of its age. While the 
Division might make it a practice on an ad hoc basis to decline prosecution of a violation 
that occurred more than five years prior to the date a complaint is submitted, it is not 
required to adhere to sucb a practice without exception, and does not. Jt is a. question of 
agency discretion. 
6. As to the emerald deal, the Commission concludes that it was an investmenl contract and, 
therefore, was a security, as follows: 
a. The Persches and Reutlingers furnished initial value as offerees when they bought 
into the emerald deal. Where Respondent solicited their participation, in the 
transaction, he was an offerer, 
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persch es and Reut1ingers was subjected 
to the risks of James's use and management, as well as to the risks of the gem 
markel. 
4 See the Commission's March 24, 2014 order denying RespondenL's motion for summn.ry judgment. 
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c. The Persches and Reutlingers were induced to buy into the emerald deal by 
Respondent's promises and representations th.at they would receive a three-fold 
return on their investment within 90 days. A three-fold return constitutes a 
valuable benefit over and above· the initial value tendered. In.addition, the 
Persches and Reutlingers had neither the obligation nor the opportunity to 
participate in or direct the purchase, transport, and resale of the emeralds in order 
to receive the promised return on their investments. Therefore, the return was 
premised on the operation of the emerald deal as an enterprise, not on the work 
and contribution of the Persch es and ReutJingers. 
d. Neither the Persches nqr the Reutlingers had any duty, obligation, or opportunity 
to participate in or control decisions made by James and his associates in 
procuring emeralds for resale. Therefore, neither bad practical or actual control 
over the managerial decisions regarding the emerald deal. 
7. Utah Code § 6 l-1-1 (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of securities to 
directly or jndirectly make an untrue statement as to a material fact. 
8. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches1 invesbnents 
wouJd be used for FOREX trading and would generate a five-fold return. A reasonable 
person would routinely consider the rate of retum and the nature of the investment in 
determining whether to invest. Therefore, the infonnation provided by Respondent on 
these issues constitutes material facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts 
were untrue, he violated Section 61-1-1 (2). 
9. As to the emerald deal, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches and Reutlingers would 
receive a three-fold return on their investment, which would remain in an escrow accowtt 
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within the United States as proof of funds in the purchase of gem-quality emeralds. A 
reasonable person would routinely consider the rate of return, the nature of the 
investment, and the proposed use of invested funds in determining whether to invest. 
Therefore, the information provided by Respondent on these issues constitutes material 
facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts were untrue, he engaged in an 
additional violation of Section 6J-1-1 (2). 
10. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-J-J (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of 
securities to directly or indirectly fail to disclose material information that would be 
necessary jn order to make representations made not misleading. 
11. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the 
risks, nature, and track record of the offering when he assured the Persches that their 
money would be safe. Had the Persches known Respondent to be a convicted gambler, 
and had they widerstood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, they 
would have had reason to doubt Respondent's assurances, Therefore, Respondent's 
omissions were material and resulted in investors being misled into believing that their 
money was not at risk. These circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 
61-1-1(2). 
12. As to the emerald transaction, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the 
risks, nature, and suitability of the offering when he assured the Persches and Reutlingers 
that their money would be safe. As to the Reutlingers1 investment and the Persches1 final 
investment, Respondent also failed to disclose that a return due to him was delinquent. 
Had the Persches and Reutlingers known Respondent to be a convicted gambler, had they 
understood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, and had they 
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understood that promised returns were already delinquent, they would have had reason to 
doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's omissions were material and 
resulted in investors being misled into believing that their money was not at risk. These 
circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 61-1-1 (2). 
13. In concluding that Respondent made false statements and material omissions regarding 
the emerald deal, the Commission has considered Respondent's argument that he was not 
the maker of the statements he conveyed to investors. In making this argument, 
Respondent relies on the case of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, ] 31 S. 
Ct. 2296 (2011). 
14. The Janus Capital decision interprets federal law and establishes a safe haven for a 
person who disseminates fn1se infonnation to investors but does not have "authotity over 
the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it. 11 Id at 2303. The 
Janus Capital safe haven is not appHcab]e in this case, particularly given Respondent)s 
lack of credibility. 
15. First, the Janus Capital test regarding who is ''the maker" of a statement has not been 
adopted in Utah. Utah Code§ 61-1-1(2) states that it 11is wtlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact[.]" There is no 
state court decision to interpret the verb 11 to make, 11 which interpretation is the focus of 
the Janus Capital case. As such, the applicable law does not djstinguish the creator of a 
false statement from a person who repeats or passes along misinformation. 
16. Second, even if the Janus Capital test were the law in Utah, Respondent did have 
authority over the content and dissemination of the statements he made. In the Janus 
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Capital cases the problem statements were published in a prospectus filed by, and bearing 
the name of, the entity that controlled the offering. TI,ere is no parallel circumstance here. 
Respondent did not pass along to investors a description or prospectus written by and 
attributed to James. Instead, he personally sought out investors and made verbal 
representations and promises lo them. Indeed, Respondent described the emerald deal as 
"his deal." He had complete control over the statements he made. He had complete 
discretion regarding to whom he made the statements. More importantly, the Commission 
does not find credible Respondent's argument to the effect that he couldn't have known he 
was sharing untrue and misleacLing information. At the relevant time, Respondent was a 
top producer for GIT. He had been with the company for some time, and he had a 
personal relationship with James. As such, the Commission concludes that Respondent 
was in a position to exercise due diligence, through which he could and should have 
discovered the truth about the low quality of the emeralds; the lack of a ready, willing, 
and able buyer; and other material facts regarding lhe transaction. In these circumstances, 
the Commission concludes that Respondent is liable for the statements he ·made to the 
Persches and the Reutlingers. 
17. Utah Code§ 61-1-20 provides that a person who is found to have violated Section 61-1-1 
et seq may be ordered to cease and desist from further violations and may be ordered to 
pay a fine. 
18. In assessing a fine, the Commission is authorized to consider the amount of investor 
losses. In this case, the Corn.mission calculates that the Persches and Reutlingers have lost 
a total of $315,000. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently jn the possession of 
the Persches have some value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. 
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19. While an offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the 
Commission has the burden to calculate it. The investors did not enter into the emerald 
deal in order lo obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a finandal profit. If 
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than through a 
financial profit, he has the burden to prove his position, including the value of the 
emeralds to a reasonable certainty. Here, Respondent has speculated to that end, but has 
failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish a basis for offsetting 
the fine requested by the Division. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Utah Securities 
Commission orders Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Utah Code§ 
61-1 et seq. In addition, Respondent is permanently barred from associating with any broker-
dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah for life; from acting as an agent for any issuer or 
solicitor of investor funds in Utah for life; and from being licensed in any capacity in the 
securities industry in Utah for )ife. Finally, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Utah Division of 
Securities a civil penalty in the amount of $413,750, as foJlows: 
• $315,000 in investor losses; 
• $78,750 as a fine for violations of Utah Code§ 61-1-1 et seq as herein found; and 
• $25,000 in investigative costs. 
The total civil penalty is due in full with 15 days of the date of this order. 
This order shall be effectjve on the latest of the signature dates below. 
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NOTICE OF RJGHT TO ADMINISTRA TlVE REVIEW 
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review 
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box 
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thirty (30) days after the date of this 
order. The agency action in this case was a formal proceeding. The laws and rules 
governing agency review of this proceeding are found in Section 63G-4-101 et seq. of the 
Utah Code, and Rule 151-4 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ,t_sdtay of llflltl~ ----,-2014 the undersigned served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FlNDING~ONCLUSlONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
by mailing a copy through first-class mai1, postage prepaid, to: 
Jack Phillips 
c/o Mark Pugsley, Maria E. Heckel 
Counsel for Jack Phillips 
36 South State Street, SuHe 1400 
SaJt Lake City, UT 841 1 1 
and caused a copy to be hand delivered to: 
Paul Amann, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General of Utah 
Fifth Floor, Heber M. We11s Building 
Sa1t Lake City, Utah 
Keith Wood well, Utah Division of Securities 
Special Assistant A ttomey General 
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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'; Wt QUINNEY 
JAN 12 2015 ~ 
___________________________ _____,:, NEBEKER 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1N THE MA TIER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
FINDINGS OF FACT., 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
and 
Jack Phillips, ORDER ON REVIEW 
PETITIONER Case No. SD-12-0001 
INTRODUCTION 
O()C t{ i:l' , 
CifOJ' 1,v·r~:.ilr11R ' 
.-&> , , I :f't ~/IR,.., 
Jack Phillips ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") followfog a decision 
entered against him by the Utah Securities Comrnission (hereafter "Commission'i on 
May 23, 2014 .. 
STATUTES OR RULES .PERMITTING OR :REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant lo Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 630-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, RlSl-4-901 et seq. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
I. Whether Petitioner has fail~ to properly challenge the Commission's 
Findings of Fact. 
2. Whether Petitioner has failed to establish that the Commission improperly 
interpreted or applied the law. 
3. Whether Petitioner failed to establish that the fiues assessed were a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, 
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4. Whether a remand for more detailed findings and conclusions is 
appropriate solely on the Commission's application of Utah Admin. Code Section RI 64-
31-l(B). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Oregon who hos never been licensed to sell 
securities in Utah. 
2. On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Securities (''Division") issued a 
Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause dated December 29, 2011. The 
Order to Show Cause also named J runes Elliott as a respondent. The Division alleged 
that Petitioner and Elliot1 sold two investment opportunities to Utah ~itizens (the Persches 
and Reutlingers) in violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act: 1 ( l) a multi-level 
marketing opportunity called GIT, and (2) a deal involving the purchase of emeralds. 
3. Elliott did not participate in the proceedings and the Division issued an 
Order of Default against him. 
4. On March 27, 2014, the parties entered into a Stipulation on Undisputed 
Facts. 
5. A hearin~ was held before tilt:: Commission on March 27, 20 l 4 and April 
21, 2014. 
6. On May 23, 2014, the Commission's Flndings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order ("Order'>) was entered permanently barring Petitioner from associating 
with any broker-dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah. n.cting as an agent for any 
issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and being licensed i!l any capacity in the 
securities industry in Utah. The Commission also assessed a civil penalty of$413,750.00 
'Hereafter, "Securities Act" 
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($315,000.00 of which was for investor losses; $78,750.00 as a fine for violations of the 
Securities Act; and $25,000.00 for investigative costs). The Commission concluded that 
the GlT investment and the emerald deal were investment contracts and therefore 
securities, and that Petitioner violated the Securities Act in providing false material 
information or omitting material information about the securities to investor. 
7. Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review on June 9, 2014. The 
parties have sjnce filed their memoranda . 
. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce 
correspond to those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 630-4-403(4). Utah Admin. Code R151-4-905. 
2. On agency review I Petitioner asks that the Order be reversed on the 
following grounds: {l) that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in assessing 
the civil penalty against Petitioner, (2) the assessed fme is excessive and violates the 
Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, (3) the Commission wrongly shifted the 
burden of proof to Petitioner to prove investor loss, (4) the statute of limitations 
prevented action taken against Petitioner> (5) it was error to impose a duty of diligence on 
Petitioner to investigate investments offered by others before recommending them to 
potential investors, and (6) Petitioner was not the maker of statements about investment 
opportunities. 
A. The Commission's Findings of Fact Accepted ns Conc]usive 
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3. The Division asks the Executive Director to strike or disregard the 
Statement of Facts section in Petitioner1s Memorandum in Support of Request for 
Agency Review. The Division points out that Petitioner's Statement of Pacts is large]y 
argument and often refers to what fmdings and conclusions are not found in the 
Commission's Order. 
4. To successfully challenge a finding of fact, a party requesting agency review 
must show that the finding is not supported ,by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record. Subsection 63G-4-403(4)(g). The burden remains upon the party 
challenging the facts to marshal all of the evidence in support of the decision and to show 
that despite such evidence, the decision is not supported by aubstantia1 evidence. Subsection 
Rl 51-4-902(3)(a). 11An appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that 1he evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below," Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 
216, ,r 6, 138 P.3d 63. Moreover, a petitioner fails to satisfy his obligation to marshal the 
evidence in persistently arguing his own position without regard for the evidence supporting 
the Division's findings. Reineke v. Dept of ComnJerce, 810 P.2d 459,464 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). The failure to marshal the evidence pennits the Executive Director to accept findings 
of fact made by the Comnussion as conclusive. Subsection R151-4 ... 902(3)(c); Campbell v. 
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
5. Petitioner's Statement of Facts js indeed unusual as noted by the Division; 
it also appears to confuse findings of foct with conclusions oflaw. In response to the 
Division,s request that the Statement of Facts be stricken, Petitioner states that he 
"accepts as true the findings of fact with the exception of paragraph 17 /1 which Petitioner 
4 
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believes he properly marshaled. Reply Memorandum., pp. 2-3. However, Petitioner has 
not met the marshaling requirement with regards to Paragraph 17 of the Commission's 
Findings of Fact, which states: 
In soliciting the Persches and Reutliagers to invest in the emerald deal, 
[Petitioner] omitted to explain or disclose the following: 
a. The fact that [Petitioner] had been convicted for illegal gambling, 
b. The id.entity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from 
James. 
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment, 
d, The number of investors, 
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised. 
f. Suitability factors for the investment and investors. 
g. The nature of any competition, 
b. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a 
security or exempt from registration; 
i. Whether [Petitioner) was licensed to sell securities or exempt from 
licensure. 
Thus, Paragraph 17 refers to information that. Petitioner failed to disclose. Petitioner 
apparently does not dispute that he did not disclose the informatio!11isted in Paragraph 
17. Rather, Petitioner's Statement of Facts attempts to marshal the evidence in support of 
a conclusion that knowledge of Petitioner's criminal conviction would have been material 
and relevant to a decision to invest, which was not the substance of the finding in 
-ParagraP,h 17 .. . ....... • ••• t 
6. Because Petitioner failed to meet the marshaling requirement in 
Subsection R151-4-902(3)(a) in challenging Paragraph 17, and because he states that he 
challenges no other finding of fact in the Order, the Executive Director accepts the 
Commission's Findings ofFact as conclusive. Subsection RI 51-4-902(3)(c); Campbell, 
at 808. It is therefore unnecessary to strike Petitioner's Statement of Facts. 
B, Failure to Establish Improper Application or Interpretation of Law 
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7. Petitioner raises various arguments relating to the application and 
interpretation of the Utah Securities Act; that the statute limits fines for violations to 
$] 0,000.00, that the Division is required to file a civil action to enforce the Commission's 
orders, that the Commission does not have statutory authoriLy to make an award of 
restHution, and that part of the action in this case was barred by a five-year statute of 
limitations. 
8. Under the Utah Securities Ac~ it is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purcha9e of any security1 directly or indirectly to: 
[M]ake an untrue statement of a material fact or to ornit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the Light of the 
circwns~ces under which they are made, not misleading. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1·1(2). Section 61-1-20 authorizes the Division and the 
Commission to take an e.dministrative or civil action for violations of the Securities Act 
as follows: 
Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging, 
or is about to engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of dus 
chapter or a rule or order under this chapter, in addition to specific powers 
granted in this chapter: 
(l)(a) The director may issue an order directing the person to appear 
before the commission a.Rd show-cause why an order should not be jssued 
directing the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or 
practice, or doing an act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shaU state the reasons for the order and the 
date of the hearing; 
(c) director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a 
person named in the order; 
(d) the eommlssion shalJ hold a hearing on the order to show cause no 
sooner than 10 business days after the order is issued; 
(e) after the hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and 
desist from engaging in any act or practice. constituting a violation of this 
chapter or a ruJe or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a fine; 
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(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with 
a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this statej and 
(h) the commi.ssion may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections 
(I )(e) through (g), 
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of 
this stale or the appropriate court of another state to enjoin an act or 
practice and to enforce compliance with this chapter or a rule or order 
under this chapter. 
(b) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the 
. co'Jrt may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's 
assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order recission; 
(vii) order restitution; 
(viii) impose a fine ofnot more than $10,000 for each violation of the 
ch.apter; and 
(ix) enter any other rel:ef the court coosiders just. 
(c) the court may not require the division to post a bond in en action 
brought under this subsection (2) 
(3) An order issued under Subsection (I) shall be accompanied by v.Titten 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(4) When detennining the severity of a sanction to be imposed under th.is 
section, the commission or court shall consider whether: 
(a) the person against whom the sanction is to be imposed exercised undue 
influence; or 
(b) the person against whom the sanction is imposed undel' this section 
knows or should know that an investor in the investment that is the 
grounds for the sanction is a vulnerable adult. 
Section 61-1-20 (emphasis added). Willful violations of the Securities Act may also 
result in criminal action against the perpetrators. Section 61-1-21. In a criminal matter, 
in addition to ordering the individual to serve time in jail, the court may impose the 
penalties in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b).2 
1 Where the person violat[llg the Securities Act is a liecnso applicant or a licensee, the Division may deny 
the application or the Commission may take 11cUon against the licensee for violations of the Securities Act 
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9. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed by the Executive 
Director under a correctness standard. ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2009 
' 
UT 36, 17,211 P.3d 382. "In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language, unless 
it is ambiguous." State v. Johnson, 224 P.3d 720, !29, 2009 UT App 382. Where a 
statutory ambiguity exists, securities laws are given broad and liberal construction to give 
effect to the legislative purpose of preventing fraud. Id. (citations omitted). "OnJy when 
we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy consjderation." Salt Lake Cowity v. Holliday 
Water Co., 2010 UT 4S, 131, 2010 UT 45, citing World Peace Movement of Am. v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 819 P .2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). 
10. Petitioner raises various public policy considerations which need not be 
considered, because the plain meaning of the applicable statutes is clear. First. the 
Division's administrative action against Petitioner for the OlT investment opportunity ls 
not barred by a statute of limitations. Petitioner claims that the five-year statute of 
limitations in Subsection 61-1-2 l.1 applies to administrative actions as well as civil and 
criminal actions. Subsection 61-1-21. l provides that "[njo indictment or information 
-~ay be returned or civil ·eomplaint-filed under this cha.ptei, more than five years after the 
alleged violation." In her Recommended Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment issu~ on March 24, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") ruled on this 
issue and made a recommendation to the Commission that Subsection 61-1-21.l did not 
limit the Division's administrative actions to five years. The Commission adopted the 
ALJ's recommendation. 
pursuant to Section 61-1 •6, Since Petitioner is not a licensee or an applicant for a licenso, Section 61-1-6 Is 
not relevant lo the analysis in this case. 
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I J. The plain language of Subsection 61-1-21.1 imposes a five-year statute of 
limitations on civil and criminal actions. The ALJ and the Cornrrussion correctly 
interpreted this provision as inapplicable lo administrative actions by the Division. The 
instant matter is not a lawsuit in a cow1 of law or a criminal action. "in the absence of 
specific legislative authority, civil statutes of limitalion are inapplicable to administrative 
disciplinary proceeclings,,, RogerJ' v. Div. of Real Estate of Dep 't of Business Regulations, 
790 P .2d 102, 105 (Utah 1990). Had the Utah Legislature inlended to establish a statute 
of limitations for administrative actions under the Securities Act, it would have so stated 
its intention in the Act. Bourgeous v. U1ah Dep't o/Commerce, 2002 UT App 5, !21, 41 
P.3d 461. 
12. Section 61-1-20 sets forth.two options for the Division in taking action 
against an individual who has violated the Securities Act. The Division-may talce an 
administrative action against the individual by issuing an order to show cause and 
holding a hearing. Subsection 6 l-l -20(l)(a)- (d). After the hearing, the Commission 
may issue a cca~e and desist order, impose a fine, and bar or suspend the person from 
associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment ndviser in this state. Subsection 
61-l-20(1)(e) :- (g}. The statute do~s not establish a fine limitation or cap as to 
administrative proceedings initiated under Subsection 61-1-20(]). 1n this case, the 
Division initiated an administrn1ive action under Subsection 61-1-20(1) by issuing its 
Order to Show Cause. 
13, Petitioner claims that he should not be liable under the Securities Act, 
because he was not the maker of any statements that were jn violation of Section 61-1-1. 
Under Section 61-1-1(2), it is unlawful for any person to make an untrue statement of a 
UT. Div of Securilles 





material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The 
Commission foW1d that Petitioner made representations and failed to notify the 
Reutlingers and Persches of various pieces of infonnation that a reasonable person would 
find material too. decision to invest.3 Commission Order, 1il 8, 9, 16, 17. Petitioner 
relies on the Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011). However, Jam,s interpreted federal securities laws, rather than the Utah 
Securities Act at issue in this ca~e. Here, Subsection 61-1-1(2) applies to "any person" 
who makes an untrue statement or makes a material omission artd does not distinguish the 
creator of a false statement from a person who repeals or passes along the information. 
Moreover, as the Commission noted, Petitioner personally sought out investors and made 
verbal represen~lions a11d promises to them, including describing the emerald deal as 
"his deal''. 
14. The analysis of Subsection 61-1-1 (2) in State v. Johnson, is applicable and 
persuasive. Johnson was an attorney who sat in the room with a men named Schwenke 
who spoke to potentiaJ investors about an investment opportunity. During the meeting, 
S-chwenke introduced fohnson as a "high powered law.yer" and a "securit)'. expert from 
New York," and neither Schwenke nor the appellant notified the potential investors that 
appellant was the subject of disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State Bar for 
misapproprialing client funds, .224 PJd 720, ~2. After the district court convickd 
Johnson for securities fraud, Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals. One of his 
3 Gohler v. Wood. 919 P2.d 561 (Utah 1996), held that Seclion 61-1-1(2) does not contain a subjective 
reliance element, that ii wus not necessary lo establish that the individunl inveslors relied upon tbe 
statements made, so long as a reasonablo person in similar circumsranccs would have relied upon 1he 
statements in making the investment. Johnson, 1111144. Also, cviden~ ofuctual reliance is appropriate. ill 
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arguments on appeal was that Subsection 61-1 • 1 (2) requires that the person who omits a 
material fact aJso be the person who made the predicate statement. The Court held that 
Schwenke•s statements regarding Johnson's background were designed to create 
confidence in the transaction and gave th·e potential investors a false sense of security. 
Id., 14 3, The Court further stated, "the jury could have reasonably found that predicate 
statements were made and that Johnson omitted to state a material fact necessary to make 
those statements not mfaleadtng.1• Id According to the Court, Johnsoo>s. view would 
inject language not found in the statute and would allow a person to evade criminal 
liabi1ity by remaining silent while others make gross misstatements about the person•s 
background, skills, experience, or other qualities, Id, at ~42, footnote 16. Under 
the State v. Johnson analysis, the Commission•s conclusion that Petitioner was 
responsible for violations of the Securities Act was proper. Because it is concluded that 
the Janus Capital analysis is inapplicable in this case, it is not necessary to address 
Petitioner's argument that the Commission wrongfully imposed upon bjm a duty of due 
diligence. 
15. Petitioner relies on Subsection 61-1-20(2), the option of filing a civil 
action, in arguing that the Com.mission's fine authority is limite{i to $10,000.00. Under 
Subsection 61-1-20(2), the di~trict court has the authority to issue an injunction, a 
restraining order or wrj t of mandamus; the court may also order restitution and impose a 
fine ofnot more than $10,000 for each violation of the Securities Act. Subsection 61-1 • 
20(2)(b). Petitioner would like the fine limitation in this Subsection to be applied to 
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administrative actions,4 but interpreting the statute that way would be to ignore the plain 
meaning of the Act, which does not include the same limitation for administrative actions 
under Subsection 61-1-20(1). The Securities Act plainly treats the two types of actions, 
administrative and civil, as separate mattezs with separate remedies. Moreover, the Utah 
Supreme Court bas held that administr~tive matters are m1ique statutory proceedings and 
not civil actions. Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate of Dep 'I of Business Regulations, 790 
P .2d 102, 105 (Utah 1990). Had the Utah Legislature intended to set limitations on fines 
resulting from administrative actions, it would have so stated iJ1 Subsection 61-1-20( 1 ). 
Wjth respect to criminal proceedings for willful violations of Securities Act., for example, 
lhe Legislature specific1dly provided that the penalties included those provided in 
Subsection 61-l -20(2){b ), with the fine liroit of$ I 0,000.00 for each violation, while the 
Commission's authority to impose fines against respondents in a disciplinary action 
contains no limiting language in Subsection 61-l-6(l)(a)(iv) •. 
l 6. Petitioner relies on State v. Bushman, 231 P.3d 833, 2010 UT App 120, 
arguing that the Utah Court of Appeals held lhat Subsection 61-1-2.0(l) limits the fines in 
administrative proceedings to $10,000.00. In that case, an individual who had agreed to a 
con.sent orde1· with ~he Div.isi,m argued that.criminal a~tiQil taken against hlm would 
violate his constitutional rights age.inst double jeopardy. The Court held that the criminal 
action did not violate double jeopardy principles, stating that fines assessed in an 
administrative proceedi11g were a civil penalty and intended for remedial puzposes rather 
than for punishment, which is reserved for criminaJ actions. Bushman, ,rn l 0-20. The 
• Interestingly, Petitioner want., to b'eat Subsections 61-1-20(1) and (2) the same when it comes to a limil or 
$10,000.00 for each violation of the Securities Act, but then argues that they are different as to restitution -
be cannot have it both ways, 
12 
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Court also held that the Security Act's fine authority was not excessive in relation to its 
beneficial and remedial purpose. ld, f21. ln a subsequent footnote1 the Court stated: 
We note that the fines that the Division could impose and judicially 
enforce were limited to $500 for each violation of the Act at the time of 
the entry of the Consent Order, see Utah Code Ann. §6J-1-20(2)(b)(vii) 
(2006), and are now limited to $10,000 per violation, see id §61-J-
20(2)(b)(viii) (Supp. 2009). We express no opinion as to whether a fine 
that is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the underlying securities 
vlolation might give rise to some sort of as-applied double jeopardy • 
challenge in the appropriate case; this case, however, does not present 
such circwnstances. · 
Id., footnote 4. Petitioner relies on this footnote 4. It is important Lo note, however, that 
in Bushman, the Court considered the double jeopardy clause issue and the differences 
between criminal end administrative actions; the Court did not squarely address the 
differences between administrative and civil actions. Thus, the Court's footnote did not 
focus on the fine limits i~ an administrative action as opposed to fine limits in a civil 
action. If that was squarely at issue, the Court would certainly have tloted the plain 
language of Sections 61-1-20(1) and (2), with a limit of$10,000.00 provided only-in civil 
notions-} Finally, even if it were held that the Commisslon>s authority to issue fines for 
violations of the Sec~rities Act is limited to $10,000.09 per violation, the Commission,s 
Ord~r with its fine of$78,750.00 for four violations of the Act would meet such a Ii~t 
See Commission Order, p. 13. ;Petitioner clearly challenges the $3 l 51000.00 fine 
I 
assessed for investor losses, which is addressed fully below. / 
17. Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, the Securities Act does not require the 
Division to first obtain an administrative order from the Commission under Subsection 
61-1-20(1) and then file a civil action under Subsection 61-1-20(2) to enforce the 
Commission's order. The plain language in Section 61-1-20 does not make the 
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administrative action dependent on a follow up civil action, This is clear from the use of 
''may" rather than "shall 11 in both Subsection 61-1-20( 1) and (2). 11 According to its 
ordinary construction, the term 'may means permissive, and it should receive th.at 
interpretation unless such a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intentfon of 
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or absurdity." MC. v. K.H.C. 
(state Ex Rel M.C.), 940 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citations omitted. The 
term 11shall,U is usually presumed mandatory. Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). See also Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 
(Utah 1974) ("The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command.''). 
18. As the Division has pointed out., ifwe interpreted Section 61-1-20 to 
require the Division lo file a civil action each time an order in an administrative action 
was issued, there would be no reason to file any administrative actions before the 
Commission and Subsection 61-1-20(1) would b~ superfluous. It is our duty to avoid 
interpreting a stalute in a manner that renders portions of the statute meaningless. Brent 
Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div., 139 P .3d 2961 
111, 2006 UT App 261 ~ Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616,119, 2000 UT 19. Any reliance on 
Subsection 630-4-50 l(lXa) is misplaced. That Subsection provides, ''fi]n addition to 
other remedies provided in law, an agency may seek enforcement of any order by-seeking 
civil enforcement in the district court." That Subsection also uses a permissive "may," 
and does not make it mandatory for an agency to immediately file a civil action to 
enforce its orders, Rather, Subsection 630-4-501 (1) provides the agency a remedy when 
a violator fails to comply with an administrative order of Lhe agency. 
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19. Petitioner next claims that the Commission violated its statutory authority 
in assessing a $315,000.00 fine for investor losses, stating that the fine in fact constjtutes 
restitution, which the Commission does not hove the authority to assess under Subsection 
61-1-20(1). However, the Legislature gave the Commission the authority in Section 61-
1-20(1 )(f) to impose a fin<;,, and as stated previously, there is no limit set by the 
Legislature for such fines in an administrative action. The Legislature also gave the 
Division the authority, with the concurrence of the Commission, to adopt rules to carry 
out the provisions of the Securities Act. Section 61-1-24(l)(a). 
20. Pursuant to a rule adopted by the Divisioa, the Commission may consider 
various factors in detennining the amount of fines against violators of the Securities 
Act. Utah Adm in. Code Section R 164-31-l 1 "Guidelines for Assessment of 
Administrative Fines," provides: 
(1) For the purpose of detennining the amount of an administrative ·fine 
assessed agai~ a person under the Utah Unifonn Securities Act, the 
Commission shall consider the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness, nature, circwnstances, extent, and persistence of the 
conduct constituting the violation; 
(b) the harm to other persons. including the q.mount of investor losses. 
resulting either directly or indirectly from the violation; 
(c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration 
received directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation; 
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division 
concerning the violation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of the violation, 
and efforts to mitigate the harm caused by the violation, including any 
restitutio.n paid or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the 
acts of lhe person; 
(e) the history of previous violations by the person; 
(f) the need to deter the peCSOJ? or other persons from committing such 
violations in the future; 
(g) the costs of the Division in investigating and prosecuting the action; and 
(h) such other matters as justice may require. 
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Rl64-31-l(B}(emphasis added). Therefore, the $315,000.00 fine was not for 
restitution, but was assessed pursuant to authority granted to the Commission as 
part of its administrative action against someone who violated the ~ecurities Act. 
Petitioner's reliance on a newspaper article supposedly quoting the Division 
Director is misplaced. The Division Director's reference in that article was to a 
whistle blower provision in the Securities Act, which allows the Commission to 
make an award from the Securities InvesLigadons, Education, Licensing, and 
Enforcement Fund to a person who reports a violation of the Act. Section 61-1-
106. 
21. Petitioner argues that the Division failed to carry out its burden of proof 
as to losses suffered by the Persches1 claiming that the Division has a duty to establish the 
value of the stones now in possession of the Persches for a potential offset or reduction in 
Petitioner's fine. Pursuant to Utah Admjn. Code R l 51 -4-709( I.), the Di vision has the 
burden of proof to establish a violation of the Secudties Act pursuant to its Order to 
Show Cause. The Division met that burden. Nothing in the applicable laws or rules 
requires the Division to prove any offset to the fines properly assessed by the 
Commission·pursuant to statute. The Division and the Commission are ~ot assessing 
actual damages like in a civH case and need not engage in the analysis of actual value of 
the stones. Given that the Division met the burden of proof to establish Petitioner's 
violations of the Securities Act, it was not unreasonable for the Commis~ion to require 
Petitioner to establish the value of the stones. Hnd Petitioner presented evidence of the 
actual value of the stones, the Commission would have offset the fines assessed. The 
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Commission Order stated that while a potential offset could be appropriate> Petitioner 
has the burden to establish th'e valu~ of those stones. Commission Order, at 13. 
22. The total civil penalty of$413,750'.00 does not violate the Eighth 
Amendm~nt, which states "[e]xcessive bail shall not be requ!redJ oar excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. U.S. Constitution. A,nendment 
Vl11. Petitioner relies on the case of United Stales v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
Mr. Bajakajian at1empted to transfer $3571 144.00 in casn out of the country and he failed 
to disclose those funds in violation of law. Bajakajian, at 334. The question was 
whether it violated the Eighth Amendment to require him to forfeit the entire amount. 
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that forfeiture of the entire amount would violate the 
Eighth Amendment, stating the principles that the amount of the forfeiture must bear 
some relationship to the gravity of the offense and judgments about th.e appropriate 
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance with the legislature. Jd,at 334, 
336. 
23. The Utah Supreme Court used that Bajakajian analysis in Brent Brown 
Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div. TI1e Court h.eld that a fine 
, violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is "grossly disproportiona} to the gravity of a . 
defendant>s offense.': Brown, 139 P.3d 296, at 116. The Court also stressed that the fine 
assessed should be compared to the maximum that could have been levied, and that the 
extent of the unlawful activity and amount of iJlega~ gain should be considered in relation 
to the penalty and the harm caused. The Court upheld the fine of $135,000.00 assessed 
by the Utah Division of Vehicle Enforcement against Brent Brown Dealerships for 
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selling vehicles through unlicensed sales people as not grossly disproportional to the 
repeated licensing violations over a period of time. Id, at 120. 
24. Now applying the analysis in Brown and Bajakajian, the Executive 
Director concludes that the $413,750.00 fine assessed against Petitioner is not grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of Petitioner's conduct and violation of law. The Utah 
Legjslature gave the Commfasion the authority to talce administrative action against lhose 
who violate the Securities Act and to assess fines for such violations. The Legislature did 
not establish a maximum fine that the Commission may impose. Petitioner's conduct in 
presenting the investment opportunities to the Persches and the Rcutlingers in vfolation of 
Subsection 61-1-1(2) was deserving of the $413,750.00 fine in Jigbt of the four violations 
of the Securities Act involving multiple investors, the investigation costs incurred by the 
Division, and the victims1 loss of more than $315,000.00 in amounts invested. As the 
Division has pojnted out, Bajakajian and Brown are distinguishable. There were no 
victims with losses of $315,000.00 in those cases. Jn Brown, those who purchased cars 
from unlicensed dealers receiyed the value of their investment when they rece~ved 1heir 
vehicles, while in Bajakajian, there we.re no victjms. In addition, there we.s only one 
violation of ~aw in BaJakajian. 
25. Petitioner hns also failed to establish that the civil penalty of $413,750.00 
was clearly unreasonable. In Johnson-Bowles v. Division of Sec., 829 P .2d 101, 114 
(Utah App.), ce11. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (U1ab 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals 
examined Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) and found that the Legislature granted the agency 
express or, at the least, implicit discretion to penalize the licenses of s~curities brokers for 
violations of the Securities Act. Due to the broad discretionary powers of the agency to 
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impose sanctions, the Court held that it would 11not disturb the agency's decision unless it 
is clearly unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of that discretion. 11 Johnson-Bowles, 829 
P.2d at 116, citing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)( 1989), predecessor to 
Subsection 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i). Accordingly, the Executive Director will not disturb the 
civil penalty assessed by the Commission, because as discussed in paragraph 22 above, 
Petitioner has failed to establish that the fine is clearly unreasonable. Johnson .. Bowle'S, 
829 P. 2d at 116. 
26. Petitioner claims that the Commission failed to consider the factors 
in Utah Ad.min. Code Subsection R 164-31-1 ( 1 ), Subsection Rl 64-31--1 ( l) sets forth 
numerous factors that the Commission ushall" consider in "determining the amount of an 
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform Securitie~ Act. 11 A 
review of the Commission Order indicates that the Commission acknowledges, its 
authority to consider investor losses, which is authority given in Subsection R164-31-
1 ( 1 )(b ), but the Order does not reference the rule, nor does the Order address or discuss 
the other factors in Subsection Rl64~31-l(l). An agency's findings should be sufficienlly 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was raised. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Utahns/or Better Dental Health-Davis, 
Inc. v. DavisCountyComm'n, 2005 VTApp.347,117, 121 P.Jd39. Where.a Division 
order fails to reveal a logical analysis of the applicable law and the facts, the appropriate 
remedy is a remand to the Division for further proceedings. LaSa/ Otl Co. v. Department 
o/Envtl. Quanry, 843 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Adams, atp. 8. 
· UT. Div of Securities 





27. Because the Corrurusston Order does not include a discussion and analysis 
of the factors in Subsection Rl64-3l-1 (1) that it found relevant in ~ssessing the total fine 
against Petitioner, this matter is remanded to the Comrni~sion solely for a more detailed 
Order that discusses the Commission's thought process and analysis with respect to the 
Subsection Rl q4-31- l (1) factors. 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
The Com.mjssion's Order is affi.rm.ed as follows. The Findings of Fact are 
adopted as conclusive. Petitioner has failed to establish that the Commission's 
interpretation or application oflaw was in error. The fines assessed against Petitioner do 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. However, a remand is appropriate for the limjted 
purpose of obtruning a more detailed Order that discusses the Commission's thought 
process and annlysjs with respect to the Subsection RI 64-31-1 (1) factors. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance ofth1s Order. Any Petition 
for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 630-4-401 aod 630-4-403, 
Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies1 reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeous v. 
Department o/Commerce, et al., 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
date of this Order punuant to Section 63G-4-302. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
[ certify that on the '\th day of January, 2015, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
Review by first class and certified mail to: 
MARK W PUGSLEY ESQ 
MARlA E HECK.EL 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER PC 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 14iH FL 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0385 
and caused a copy to be electronically mailed to: 
Keith Woodwell, Director (kwoodwell@utah.gov) 
Division of Securities 
160 East JOO South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tom Melton, Assistant Attomey General (tmelton@utah.gov) 
Office of the Attorney General 
Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
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BY THE UT AH SECURITIES COMMISSION: 
Pursuant to the January 9, 2015 Order issued on a.gency review by the Department of 
Commerce in this matter, ·the Utah Securities Commission supplements and amends, as follows, 
Paragraphs 18 and 19 in the Conclusions of Law section set forth in tJ,.e May 23, 2014 Order 
issued in this matter following hearing. 
18. ln assessing a fine, the Commission is charged under Utah Administrative Code§ R164--
31-l(b)(l) to consider the following factors: 
a. the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct 
congtituting the violation; 
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b. the harm to other persons1 including the amount of investor losses, resulting either 
directly or indirectly from the violation; 
c. any .financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration received 
directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation; 
d. cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division concerning 
the violation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of the violation, and efforts to 
mitigate the harm caused by the violation, including any restitution paid or 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the acts of the person; 
e. the history of previous violations by the person~ 
f. the need to deter the person or other persons from committing such violations in 
the future; 
g, the costs incurred by the Division in investigating and prosecuting the action; and 
h. such other matters as justice may require. 
In this case, Respondent developed very personal, trusting relationships with the Persches 
and Reutlingers over time. On the basis of these relationships of trust and confidence, and 
through repeated and persistent solicitation, Respondent convinced the Persches and 
Reutlingers that he was favoring them with an exclusive opportunity not otherwise 
available. This predatory behavior in taldng advantage of persons with whom he had a 
close, personal relationship constitutes affinity fraud by Respondent, which is a 
particularly serious and repellent form of deceit and must be severely sanctioned in ardor 
for the sanction to act as a deterrent. In addition, Respondent has not cooperated with the 
Divisiot1i either to locate James or in any other manner. In these circumstances, the total 
investor losses of $315,000 directly caused by Respondent's actions are appropriately 
included in the totru fine amount, as are the Division1s claimed investigative costs of 
$25,000. 
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In accordance with precedent, the Corom,jssion also finds it appropriate to assess, as a 
penalty for violations of the chapter, a fine calculated at 25% of the Lota] investor losses. 4• 
19. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of the Persches have 
some unspecified value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. While an 
offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the Commission has the 
burden to investigate and calculate a potential offset, if any. The investors did not enter 
into the emerald deal in order to obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a 
financial profit from an investment. If Respondent believes th.at the investors have been 
made whole other than through a financial return, Respondent has the burden to prove his 
position, including the value of the emeralds to a reasonable certainly, with competent 
and admissible evidence. Here, Respondent has speculated lo that end, but has failed to 
provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish any factual basis for 
offsetling the fine requested by the Division. Respondent merely speculates about 
potential value, but does not prove the value, if any, of the alleged emeralds. 
This amended order shall be effective on the latest of the signature dates below. 
4• There is no evidence in the record that Respondent received any meaningful financial benefit, enrichment, 
commission, fee or other co11sideration from lbc trllnsactio.113 involving the Perscbcs and the RcuUingcra. Nor js 
there evidence that Re.,pondcnt bas a hutory ofpmvious violations. If such evidence were available, the 
circwnslances,might constitute additional aggravating facto!'$ justifying an addjtional pt;t111Jty. Without such 
evidence, the Commi&!ion finds itappropria1e to assess Respondent's fine according to csl.ablishcd preoedent for a 
first offense where the respopdeut received little to no financial benefit from the transactions at issue. 
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DATED this __ l_day of :f7 6v'-' "r';) , 2015. 
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Signed by the Presiding Officer pursuant to a grant 
of authority from Commissioner Tim Bangerter and 
on Mr. Bangerter's behalf. 
~ 
-.J<. (J Jennie T. Jonsson, p..,,i · 
DATED this_.£_ day' orJ~ 2015. 
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Signed by the Presiding Officer pursuant to a grant 
of authority from Commissioner Brent Baker and on 




NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing n request for agency review 
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box 
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thirty (30) days after the date of this 
order. The agency action in this case was a form.nl proceeding. The laws and rules 
governing agency review of this proceeding are found lo Section 63G-4-101 et seq. of the 
Utah Code, and Rule 1S1-4 of the Utah Administrative Code, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l hereby certify that on the !:/t. day of - j ~I~ , 2015 the undersigned served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMEND.~ OF FACTj CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER by mailing a copy through first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
JACK PlfilLIPS 
C/0 MARX PUGSLEY, ;MARIA E HECKEL 
36 S STATE ST STE 1400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and caused a copy to be hand delivered to: 
Thomas Meltonr Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General of Utah 
Fifth Floor. Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Keith Woodwell, Utah Division of Secwities 
SpeciaJ Assistant Attorney General 
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Buildiog 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Francine A. Gieni, Executive Director 
c/o Masuda Medcalf, Administrative Law Judge 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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DY THE UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION: 
On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Secwities (Division) brought allegations 
~gainst Jack Phillips ("Respondent") through a Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show 
Cause. This matter was heard by four members of the Utah Securities Commission 
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("Commission") in a bearing held March 27, 2014 and April 21, 2014. The Commission has 
considered and weighed the e.d.mitted evidence according to the applicable standard of proof, that 
being a preponderance of the evidence, and now enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions oflaw, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Respondent is a resident of Oregon. 
2. Respondent has never been licensed to sell secmities. 
3. Respondent has a criminal record. On or obout October 29, 2002, Respondent was 
convicted ofW1lawful gambling in the first degree (case number 00112764, Linn County 
Circuit Court, State of Oregon), 
4. At relevant limes, Respondent has been i.nvolved in a multi-level marketing company 
called Guardian International Travel (''GIT"). 
5. Elliott James ("James") was Respondent's sponsor and a vice president at GIT. 
6. Respondent sold the GIT opportunity and was paid commissions for doing so. 
Respondent was extremely successfully in marketing GIT and was rewarded for his 
success through bonuses and gifts. 
7. Respondent was the first and primary source ofinfom1ation for Bill and Gidgette Persch 
("the Persches) and for Paul and Sherry Reutlinger ("the Reutlingers") regarding GIT. 
8. In soliciting the Persches to participate in GIT, Respondent assured them that they did not 
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return. In addition, Respondent 
made the following assurances and representations: 
a. The investments would be used for FOREX trading. 1 
1 The Commission 1alce9 notice that FORP..X trading, also known &.s the foreign exchange maTket, is a global 
decentralized market for lhc trading of cuJTencies. 
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b. Any investment would generate a five-fold return witlrin 18 months. 
9. In soliciting the Persches to invest in GIT, Respondent omitted to disclose the folJowing: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
b. The risks ;nvolved in trading foreign currencies. 
c. The track record of GIT and its investors. 
d. Whet.her the GIT investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt 
from registration. 
e. Whether Respondent w~s licensed to sell securities or exempt from Jicensure. 
10. ln or about July 2006, the Persches tendered $25,000 to GIT through Respondent. 
11. The Persches' investments were not used for FOREX trading. While the Persches 
received nominal payments foT a time, they never made back their initial investments or 
realized any profits. 
12. ln or about Novemb'1r 2006, James approached Phimps with a deal involving the 
purchase, importation, and sale of emeralds. 
13. Among other things, James toJd Respondent that James could arrange for the purchase 
and importation of emeralds, which would sell within 90 days for three times the value 
paid by an investor ("the emerald deal 11). 
14. On or about November 141 2006, Respondent invested in the emerald deal. 
15. Shortly thereafter, Respondent began soliciting lhe Persche.s and Reutlingers to join a 
conference call in which James would invite them to invest in the emerald dea.J. T11is 
solicitation took place in Utah. 
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16. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to participate in the conference call, 
Respondent assured them that they would have no responsibility to operate the enterprise 
or manage the investment. In addition, Respondent made the following representations: 
a. The emeralds were gem-quality. 
b. There was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds. 
c. Investment capi taf was needed so)ely to establish proof of funds; therefore, money 
tendered by investors would not leave the country, but would be held in an escrow 
account. 
d. An investor would make three times the investment amount within a maximum 
of90 days. 
e. There was no risk. The worst possible scenario would be a return of the initial 
investment. 
------------·· .... ~-· ··--------· --------··--· 
Al hearing, Respondent urged that James made these representations to him, thus 
inducing him to invest1 and that he merely repeated the information to those he solicited. 
The Commission did not find Respondent's testimony credible. 
l 7. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to iovest in the emerald deal, Respondent 
omitted to explain or disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
b. The identity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from James. 
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment. 
d. The number ofinvestors. 
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised. 
f. Suitability factors for the investment and investors. 
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g. The nature of any competition. 
h. Whether the emeralds investment opportWJity was registered as a security or 
exempt from registration; 
L Whether Respondent was licensed lo sell securities or exempt from licensure. 
18. On or about January 26, 2007, Bill Persch invested $30,000 in the emerald dea]. 
19. On or aboul February 14, 2007, Bill Persch invested an additional $270,000 in the 
emerald deal. 
20. Between approximately February 27, 2007 and March 5, 2007, the Reutlingers invested 
$30,000 in the emerald deal. 
21. The money tendered by the Persches and Reutlingers was not held in escrow. Some of it 
was used to purchase emeralds, but they were not gem~qua1ity. Much of it was used by 
James at his discretion. No buyer for the emeralds was in ploce at any relevant tim~. The 
investors have not realized any profits from the emerald deal. There was no credible or 
admissible evidence presented that the Persches or Reutlingers would ever realize any 
profits from the emerald deal. 
22. When the Persches and Reutlingers made their February and March 2007 investments, 
around 90 days had passed since Respondent's initial investment in the emerald deal. 
Rr,Spondent h~d not received a return on his-investment. He did·not inform the Pcrsches 
and Reutlingers of this delinquency before or shortly after the Persches and Reutlingers 
invested in the emerald deal. 
23. The emeralds purchased by James and his associates were shipped to the United ?tates. 
Currently, at least some of the emeralds are in the custody of the Persches. There is 
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insufficient info1ma.tion or admissible evidence in the record from which to calculate or 
estimate the commercial value of the gems, if any. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code § 61-1-13( I)( ee)(i)(K) provides that an investment contract is a security. Utah 
Code§ 6I-1-1J(l)(s)(ii)2 sets forth a four-pa1t test for determining whether an agreement 
under which money changes haods constitutes an investment contract. The test is as 
follows: 
a. An offeree furnishes initial value to an offerer. 
b. A portion of the initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise. 
c. Tl1e furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offerer's promises or 
representations tha.t give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit 
of some kind over and above the initial value will accrue to the offeree as a result 
ofthe operation of the enterprise. 
d. The offerec docs not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control 9ver 
the managerial decisions of the enterprise. 
2. As to the GIT investment, the Commission concludes that it was an inve_stment contract 
~d, therefore, was a security, as follows: 
2 The Commission notes that Utah Code § 61-1 el seq as in effect on March 16, 2007, did not include a definition of 
the term "investment conlrllcl." However, the fundamental elements of the test have been in effect at all relevant 
times under the common !Aw. Securities & Exd,ango Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 US. 293 (/946). The 
Utah Legislature adopted the leSl ioto slatutc iu 2009, with the fourth prong stating that the offerce has no right lo 
"practical or actual" control. The conjunction wa.~ changed lo "and'' in the 201 J Legislative $es.qion. TMl lingwslic 
change does noL affeci the analysis here. 
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a. The Persches furnished initial value as offerees when they bought into GIT. 
Where Respondent solicited the tender of this initial value, he was an offerer in 
the transaction.3 
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Perscbes was subjected to the risks of 
GIT's use aod management. 
c. The Persches were induced to buy into GIT by Respondent's promises and 
representations that they would receive a five-fold return on their investment 
within 18 mouths. A five-fold retlml constitutes a valuable beaefit over and above 
the initial value tendered. In addition, while the Persches were allowed to bring 
additional distributers into the GIT marketing system, they were assured that it 
was not necessary for them to do so in order to receive the promised return on 
their investments. Therefore, the return was premised on the operation a f GIT as 
an enterprise, not on the work and contribution of the Persches. 
d. The Persches did not have any duty, obligation, or opportunity to participate in or 
control decisions made by GIT, whether as to trading foreign currencies or 
otherwise. Therefore, they did not have practical or actual control over the 
managerial decisions of GIT. 
3. In concluding that the GIT investment was a security, the Commissiou has considered 
Respondent's argument to the effect that multi-level marketing companies and securities 
are mutually exclusive. The Commission disagrees. A multi-level m_arketing company is 
a system for advertising, distributing, and selliug something of value. If the offering that 
is advertised, distributed, and sold satisfies the statutory test for an investment contract, 
3 Utah Code§ 61-1-).l(l)(bb)(ii) defines "offer" or •offer to sell" as including "an 111tempt or offer to dispose of, or 
solicitulion of an offer to buy, a s_ecurily or interesl in a security for value" (emphasis added). 
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then it is a security, at least on the facts before the Commission in this case. It is the 
nature of the offering that is sold-not the manner of sale or the industry at issue-that 
determines whether a security is at issue. Based on the specific facts at issue, a security 
was involved in the sale of the GIT investment opportunity to the Persches. 
4. The Conunission has also considered Respondent's argument that the Persches' GIT 
transaction~ OCC\UTed more than five years prior to the dale on which the order to show 
cause was issued in this administrative ma~r. The Com.mission has previously ruled that 
no statute of litnitations applies.4 Regardless, Respondent argues that the age of the 
transaction should insulate him, in part if not in whole, from any liability regarding it. 
The Commission disagrees. 
5. The Division has discretion to prosecute any case, regardless of its age. While the 
Division might make it a practice on an ad hoc basis to decline prosecution of a violation 
that occUJTed more than five years prior to the date a complaint is submitted, it is not 
required to adhere to such a practice without exception, ond does not. It is a question of 
agency discretion. 
6. As to the emerald deal, the Commission concludes that it was an investment contract and, 
therefore, was a security, as follows: 
a. Tbe Persches and Reutlingers furnished initial value as offeree.'i when they bought 
into the emerald deal. Where Respondent solicited their participation, in the 
transaction, he was an offerer. 
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persches and Reutlingers was subjected 
to the risks of James'.s use and management, as well as to the risks of the gem 
market. 
4 See <he Commiuion's March 24, 2014 order denying R.eapoodent's motion for summary Judgment. 
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c. The Persche.c, and Reutlingers were induced to buy into the emerald deal by 
Respondent's promises and representations that they would receive a three-fold 
return on their investment within 90 days. A three-fold return constitutes a 
valuable benefit over and above the initial value tendered.. In addition, the 
Persches and Reutlingers had neither the obligation nor the opportunily to 
participate in or direct the purchase, transport, and resale of the emeralds in order 
to receive the promised rclum on tbeir investments. Therefore, the return was 
premised on the operation of the emerald deal as an enterprise, not on the work 
and contribution of the Persches and Reullingers. 
d. Neither the Persches nor the Reutlingers had any duly> obligation, or opportunity 
to participate in or contra] decisions made by James and his associates io 
procuring emerald3 for resale. Therefore, neither had practical or actual control 
over the managerial decisions regarding the emerald deal. 
7. Utah Code§ 6 J .. 1-1 (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of securities to 
directly or inclirecUy make an untrue statement as to a material fact · 
8. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches' investments 
would be used for FOREX trading and would generate a five .. fold return. A reasonable 
person would routinely consider the rate of return and the nature of the investment in 
determining whether to invest. Therefore, the information provided by Respondent on 
tl1ese issues constitutes material facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts 
were untrue, he violated Section 61 ~ 1-1 (2). 
9. As to the emerald deal; Respondent falsely stated that the Persches and Reutlingers would 
receive a three-fold return on their investment, which would remain in an escrow account 
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within the United States as proofof funds in the purchase of gem-quality emeralds. A 
reasonable person would routinely consider the rate of return, the nature of the 
investment, and the proposed use of invested funds in determining whether to invest. 
Therefore, the infomiation provided by Respondent on these issues constitutes material 
facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts were untrue, he engaged in an 
additional violation of Section 61- l -l (2). 
10. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-1(2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of 
securities to directly or indirectly ta.H to disclose material infonnation that would be 
necessary in order to make representations made not misleading. 
11. As to the GIT transactions1 Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the 
risks, nature, and track record of the offering when he assured the Perscbes that their 
money would be safe. Had the Persches known Respondent to be a convicted gambler, 
and had they understood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, they 
would have had reason to doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's 
omissions were material and resulted in investors being misled into believing that their 
money was not at risk. These circumstances constitute an additionaJ violation of Section 
61~]-](2). 
12. As to the emerald transaction, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the 
risks, nature, and suitability of the offering when he assured the Persches and Reutlingers 
that their money would be safe. As to the Reutlingers' investment and the Persches1 final 
investment, Respondent also failed to disclose that a return due to him was delinquent. 
Had the Persches and Reutlingers known Respondent to be a convicted gambler1 had they 
understood the true nalure of the investment and the risks involved, and had they 
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w,ders1ood that promised returns were already delinquent, they would have had reason to 
doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's omissions were material and 
resulted in investors being misled into believing that their money wns not at 1isk. These 
circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 6 J-1-1 (2). 
13. In concluding that Respondent made false statements and material omissions regarding 
the emerald deal, the Commission has considered Respondent's argument that he was not 
the maker of the statements he conveyed to investors. In making th.is argumen~ 
Respondent relies on the case of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Trad~rs, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296 (2011). 
14. The Janus Capital decisjon interprets federal.law and establishes a safe haven for a 
person who disseminates false information to investors but does not have "authori_ty over 
the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it." Id at 2303. The 
Janus Capital safe haven is not applicable in this case, particularly given Respondent's 
Jack of credibility. 
15. First, the Janus Capital test regarding who is "the maker'' of a statement has not been 
adopted in Utah. Utah Code§ 61-1-1(2) states that it "is unlawful for any perso~ in 
connection with the offer1 sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact o_r to omit to state a material fact[.)'' There is no 
state court decision to interpret the verb "to make, 11 which interpretation is the focus of 
the Janus Capital case. As such, the applicable law does not distinguish the creator of a 
false statement from a person who repeats or passes along misinformation. 
16. Second, even iftheJanus Capital test were the Jaw in Utah, Respondent did have 
authority over the content and dissemination of the statements be made. fu the Janus 
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Capital case, the problem statements were pub1ished in a prospectus filed by, and bearing 
the name of1 the entity that controlled the offering. There is no parallel circumstance here. 
Respondent did not pass along to investors a de.-1crlption or prospectus written by and 
attributed to James. Instead, he personally sought out investors and made verbal 
representations and promises to them. Indeed, Respondent described the emerald deal as 
"his deal.u He had complete control over the statements he made. He had complete 
discretion regarding 1o whom be made the statements. More importantly, the Comm,ssion 
does not find credible Respondent's argument to the effect that he couldn't have known he 
was sharing untrue and misleading infonnation. At the relevant time, Respondent was a 
top producer for GIT. He had been with the company for some time, and he had a 
personal relationship with James. As such, the Commission concludes that Respondent 
was jn a posit.ion to exercise due diligence1 through which he could and should have 
discovered the truth about the low quality of the emei:alds; the lack ofa ready, willing, 
and able buyer; and other material facts regarding the transaction. In these circumstances, 
the Commission concludes that Respondent is liable for the statements he made to the 
Persches and the Reutlingers. 
17. Utah Code§ 61 -1-20 provides that a person who is found to have violated Section 61-1-1 
· et seq may be ordered to cease and desist from further violations and may be ordered to 
pay a fine. 
l 8. In assessing a fine, the Commission is authorized to consider the amount of investor 
losses. In this case, the Commission ca.lcu]ates that the Persches and Reutlingers have lost 
a total of $315,000. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of 
the Persches have some value and fha.l, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. 
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19. While an offset potentially might be nppropria.te1 neither the Division nor the 
Commission has the bw-den to calculate it. The investors did not enter into the emerald 
deal in order to obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a financial profit. If 
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than through a 
financial profit1 he has the burden to prove his position, inc]uding the value of the 
emeralds to a reasonable certainty. Here, Respondent has speculated to that end, but has 
failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish a basis for offsetting 
the fine requested by the Division. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Utah Securities 
Commission orders Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Utah Code§ 
61~ 1 et seq. In addition, Respondent is permanently barred from associating with any broker~ 
dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah for life; from acting as an agent for any issuer or 
solicitor of investor funds in Ulah for life; and from being licensed in any capacity in the 
securities industry in Utah for life. Finally, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Utah Division of 
Securities a civil penalty in lhe amount of .$413,750, as follows: 
• $315,000 in investor losses; 
•• • 
0 $78,750 as a fine for violations of Utah Code§ 61-1-,I et seq as herein found; and 
• $25,000 in inv~tigative costs. 
The total civil penalty is due in fu1l with 15 days of the date of this order. 
This order shall be effective on the latest of the signature dates below. 
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DATED this ,;J,/ ddayof ~ , 2014. 
UT AH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review 
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box 
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thJrty (30) days after the date of this 
order. The agency action in this case was a formal proceeding. Tbe laws and rules 
governing agency review of this proceeding are found in Section 63G-4~101 et seq. of the 
Utah Code, and Rule 151-1 of the Utah Ad.m.inistrative Code. 
CERTIFICATE OF SER VICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ay of vJlltlvi _--:-2014 the w1dersigned served a true ~d 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGSO~ONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
by mailing a copy through first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Jack Phillips 
c/o Mark Pugsley> Mada E. Heckel 
Counsel for J ad; Phillips 
3 6 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 l 
tind caused a copy to be hand delivered to: 
Paul Amann, Assistant Attorney Genera] 
Office of the Attorney General of Utah 
Fifth Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Keith Woodwe11, Utah Division of Securities 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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rN THF. MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
SECOND FINDINGS OFF ACT, 
CONCLUSfONS OF LAW, 
~nd 
Jack Phillips, ORDER ON REVIEW 
PETITIONER Case No. SD-12-0001 
------···- ····-·•·-·-··-· -----· ----
INTRODUCTION 
Ja-ck. Phillips ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") following the 
Amt:ndcd Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order ("Amended Order") issued by 
the Ut1:1f1 Securities Commission ("Commission") on February 4, 2015. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Commission's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code 
Annol<tted, Section 630-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, Rl 51-4-901 et seq. 
ISSUES REVlEWE0 
Whetht:r Petitioner has failed to establish any error in the Commission's 
A.me11deu Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I, Petitioner is a resident of Oregon who has never been licensed to sell 
securities in Utah. 
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2. On May 23, 2014, the Commission!s Findings of Fact: Conclusions of 
Law anJ Order (''Order") were entered. The Order pennanently barred Pelitioner from 
assodating witr. any broker-dealer or investment advisor Jicensed in Utah, acting as an 
agent for any issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and being lic.ensed in any 
capacily in the securities industry in Utah. The Commission also assessed a civil penalty 
of $413,750.00 ($315,000.00 of which was for investor losses; $78,750.00 as a fine for 
violations of the Securities Acl; and $25,000.00 for investigative cosls). The 
Commission concluded Lhat Petitioner sold securities without a license in violation of the 
Utah Uniform s~curities Act by selling n multi-level marketing opportu11ity and also 
selling an inveslmenl opportunity involving the purchase of emeralds. The Commission 
held that Petilior\er further violated the Securities Act in providing false malerial 
information or omitting material informaLion about the securities to investors. 
'l 
I, l'etitionec filed a reriuest for agency review on June 9, 2014. On January 
9, 20 l \ the executive Director issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Review (0 0rder on Review") affirming the Commission's Order. The 
Executive Director>s Order on Review adopted the Commission's Findings ofFact as 
concll~5ive and held that the Commission had noL en·oneously intcrpreLed or applied the 
law. Order on Review, pp. 4-14. The Executive Director also upheld the fines assessed 
hy the Commission, concluding thal the fines were within the scope of the Commission's 
SH\tutory authority; lhal they were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of 
P,~t1tioner's conduct and vioJation of law, and thus, did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment; ancl that Petitioner had not established that the fine amount was clearly 
unreasnnabk·. Id. pp. 15-19. 
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4. The Order on Review rejected Petitioner's argument that the Division had 
the burden of proof as to losses suffered by the investors, Mr. and Mrs. Persch, and that 
the Division has a duly to establish the value of the emeralds now in the possession of the 
Pcrsches for a potential offset or reduction in the fine assessed against Petitioner. The 
Order on Review stated: 
121. Pursuant to Utah Adm in. Code R 151-4-709( l ), the Division has the 
burden of proof to establish a violation of the Securities Acl pursuant to its 
Order to Show Cause. The Division met that burden. Nothing in the 
appHcablt! laws or rules requires the Division to prove any offset for the 
fines properly assessed by the Commission pursuant to statute. The 
Division and the Commission are not assessing actual damages like in a 
civil case and need nol engage in lhe analysis of actual value of the stones. 
Given that the Division met the burden of proof to establish Petitioner's 
violations of the Securities Act, it was not unreasonable for the 
Commission to require Petitioner to establish the value of the stm1es. Had 
Petitioner presented evidence of the actual value of the stones, the 
Commission would have offset Lhe fines assessed. The Commission Order 
stated that while a potential offset could be appropriate Petitioner has the 
burden Lo cstabl ish the value of those stones. 
Comm~ssjon Order, at 13. 
5. Finally, in discussing Petitioner's claims that the Commission faiJed to 
consider the factors in Utah Admin. Code Section Rl64-31-1 in determining the amount 
of the fine, the Order on Review stated as follows: 
,26 .. , Subsection R 164-3 l-1 (1) sets forth numerous faclors that the 
Commission "shall" consider in "determining the amount of an 
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform 
SecudHes Act.n A review of the Commission Order indicates that the 
Commission acknowledges its authority to consider investor losses, which 
is aulhorily given in Subsection RI 64-31-l(l)(b), 1 but the Order does not 
reference the rule> nor does the Order address or discuss the other factors 
in Sub~ection Rl 64-31- l (I). An agency's findings should be sufficiently 
detniled and include enough subsidiary facl"s to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual is.sue was raised. Adams v. Bourd 
of Neview of Indus. Comm 'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 )1 Utahns 
for Beller Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm 'n, 2005 UT 
·--·-· ·--~-----
1 There appeal' to be· a few t)'pogr~phical error:,: in the Order on Review with respect to Lhe Division rule; 
the con eel citijiio:: is Subsection R 164-31-1 (A)( I). 
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App. 347,117, 121 P.3d 39. Where a Division order fails to reveal a 
logical analysis of the applicable law and the facts, Lhe appropdate remedy 
is a remand to the Division for further proceedings. LaSaJ OiJ Co. v. 
Department ofEnvll. Quality,843 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Adams, at 8. 
,121. Because the Commission Order does not include a discussion and 
analysis of the factors in Subsection Rl64-31-1(1) that it found relevant in 
assessing the total fine againsl Petitioner, this matter is remanded lo the 
Commission solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the 
CJmmission's (hvught process and analysis with respect to Subsection 
Rl 64-31-1 (1) factors. 
Order on Review, pp. 19-20. 
6. The Order on Review notified Petitioner of his right to file a petition for 
judicial review with lhe Court of Appeals within 30 days of the Order on Review. 
Petitioner did .f10l file a petition for judicial review lo challenge the Executive Director's 
decision which affinned the Commission's Order (including the amount of the fines 
a~sesscd and the holding that the Division did nol have a duly to prove the value of the 
emeralds for any offset of the fines assessed} and remanded the matter only for a 
di5cussion of lhe Commission's analvsis of the factors in Subsection Rl64-3 l-l (8)(1 ). 
7. On Februa,ry 4, 2015, the Commission issued its Amended Findings of 
f.'act, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Amended Order,,). TI1e Amended Order amended 
par~graphs I 8 :md 19 in the Conclusions of Law section of the original Order. The 
changes are ,.f'-.~ked below: 
,11 s. In assessing a fine, the Commission is al-f¼h&ri7.ed le co~~eer-t:he-&meUfl-t:-&t:" 
ifl-VeS{-&~e,14le-GeiM'1~--t:i-l-ates--ilia-HJ:t~e 
~:ngers ha1,•e-lest-a-t-&hl-l-0.f $] 15,000:----R-espfHiSall=-a-F~es-1-ha-H-l=te-omerolds 
e1:1rrentl y i rHhe-pessessre ~e--P-er-se-l~~0it1e-va.l ue n n<l ll~al, t'1ei:efefe.; 
any-HAc is suoje&l i-o aH o ffsat-:cbargl!d under Ut~h AdminislJ•ative Code § R 164-
3 l :-1-(b){l) to consider the folJowing factors: 
a. the. seriousness, natui:e, circumstances. exten1·, and persistence oflhe conduct 
constituting lhe violation=. 
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b. the ham, to other persons, including lhe amount of investor losses. resulting 
either directly or tnc{.irectly from the violation; 
c. any financial benefit. enrichment, commission. fee or other consideration 
received directly or indireclly by the person in connection witl1 the violation; 
d. cooperation by the person in any inguh:y conducted by the Division 
con.ceming the vi.olation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of 1he 
violation. and efforts to mitigate the harm caused hy the violation, including 
any re-slitution poid or disgorg:emenl of ill~gotten gains lo persons injured by 
the acts of the !Jerso1.~ 
e. the histo1y of previous violations by the person~ 
f. the need to ,fr~ler the person or other ncrsons from commilling such 
vioJations in the future 
g. the costs incurred by the Division in investigating and prosecuting the 
action~ and 
h. SL:ch other matter~~~ justice may require. 
In this case. Respondent developed very personal, trusting relationships with the 
Persches and Re~1tlingers over time. On the basis of these relationships of trust 
and t.u;·1tidence, and through repeated and persistent soli.~ltati<;m, Respondent 
convinced the Persches and Reutlingcrs that he was fay.Qring them wilh an 
~xclusivt: opportunity not otherwise available. This predatory behavior in t-akinu 
advanlag1:: of persons with w..hom he had a close, personal relationship consti1ules 
affinJ!y_ fraud by Respondent, which is a partjcularly serious and repellent form of 
deceit and must be severelv sanctioned in order for the sanction lo act as a 
deterrent. In addition. Respond.;:nl has not cooperated with the Division, cilher lo 
locate James or in any other manner. In these circumstances, the total investor 
losses of $315,000 directly caused by Respon<ltnt's actions are appropriately 
included in the total fine amount. as are the Division's claimed investigative costs 
Q,f $25,000. In aC~lwdancc with precedent. the Commission also finds iL 
illfilLD..ru:iate to assess. as u ru;nalty for violations or the chap\cr, a fine crilculnted at 
25% of the to Lai :nvestor losscs.'1 
--··----·-·-----
4_:rhere is no evidence in lhe record th111 RCSl}9Jl4~131.rf:.£.£i.Y.~~--fil.1Y mcaningfi.1I financial benetil, enrichmenl. 
~~mmi.,,~ion. fee or olhcr considcrnllon ((911;\Jb.~ transactions involving, the Persches and the fleutling,ers. 
"o.c...iti!ic.i·c evicJenc-e tha< l~~§RQ!!t1.~n.UroL'i.hh;Jory of previous violations. If such evidence we1·e available 
.L.he circ1m1~.li.••J~~! . .m.i_gb_U;.P..nill!llto ac!dhjona) aggrav.atlng factors justifying an a"dditlonal penalty. Without 
suc),evidcncc-'Jh2Comm ission finds ii appropriate to assess Respondent's line according. to C!>lnblished 
preced~1.1Uor a first offense where the l'eS)"!Qtt..d..~DL!.:'t~~i.'l.~Q..U.ttl~_!Q.IJ.Q_f.i!!AOJ;ial_b.~.nefit from the 
transactions at issue. 
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~ 19. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of the Persches 
have some unspecified value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. 
While an offset potentially might be appropriate. neither the Division nor lhe 
Commission has the burde11 to investigate and calculate [it]a potential offset, if 
~. The investors did not enter into the emerald deal in order to obtain 
emeralds. Their 0bjective was to realize a financial profit from an investment. If 
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than 
through a fin~11:cial (pref+t]return, [he]Respondenl has the burden to prove his 
position, including the value of the emeralds to a reasonable certainty, with 
comp~tent and admissible evidence. Here, Respondent has speculated to that 
end, but has failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to 
estabHsh any factual basis for offsetting the fine requested by the Division. 
Respondenl merely speculates about potential value, but does not prove lhe 
value, if any, of the alleged emeraJds. 
8. On March 6, 2014, Petitioner filed a re.quest for agency review of the 
Amended Order. The parties have submitted their respective memoranda. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l. The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce 
coJTesIJnnd to those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
A.I-notated Section 630-4-403(4). Utah Admin. Code RlSl-4-905. The Executive 
Director appqes the correction-of-error standard when reviewing the Commission's 
interpr~tation of general questions of law, granting M deference to the Commission•s 
decisions. Assflciated Gen. Contr. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,118, 38 
P.Jd 29 l. Therefore: whelher the Commission correctly applied the instructions given in 
the Order on Review is reviewed for correctness. 
2. Petitioner asks that the .'\mended Order be reversed. He argues that the 
Commission wrongfully assessed the $4 l 3) 750.00 fine againsl him without providing the 
necessar~· analysis of thl' f:~~lors supporting the fine under Subsection R 164-3 1-1 (B)( I), 
UT. Div of Securities 




and it is only t~ow with the Commission's "posr hoc rationalizations" and analysis in the 
Amended Order that the Executive Direclor can make an accurate determination 
regarding the reasonableness of the fine. Petitioner's Motion and Memorandum in 
Supporl of Agency Review ('1Memorandum in Support»')~ pp. 2-3. Petitioner relies on 
case law including State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 982 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) for the 
proposition that a remand for detailed findings of fact is not intended to be a mere 
"holstering" of the trial cot1rt 1s pr<.'.vious decision. Memorandum in Support, pp. 3-4. 
Petitioner incorporates by ·reference the arguments made in his prior request for agency 
review filed on June 9~ 2014. id. 
J. The Executive Dirc.ctor has already ruled on all the issues raised by 
Prtiuoner in the Order on Review issued on January 9, 2015. The Executive Director 
e:r.plici.LJy stated that the remand was for the very narrow purpose of articulating the 
Commission's thought process under Subsection R 164-31-1 (B)( I). If Petitioner believed 
that the Executive Director's ruling was improper under any legal theory: his remedy was 
to request reconsideration or seek judicial review. By remaining silent while the 
Commission acted on the Executive Director's specific instructions, Petitioner waived 
any objection he might have made as to those instructions. 
4. Petitioner argues that the Amended OrdeJ' improperly shifted the burden of 
proof to Petitioner regarding any potential offset of the fines assessed. Id., p. 3. This 
issue was fully c1ddressed in the Order on Review, and the matter was remanded to the 
Commission solely for a written discussion of the Subsection R 164~3 l-1 (B)(l) factors 
considered by the Commission. The Amended Order revised ,Il 8 in the Conclusions of 
Law hy reorganizing the discussion of lhe value of the emeralds artd any offset as to fines 
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a~sessed to a nt'.wly numbered 119 and adding the Commission ls discussion of 
Subsection R l 64-31-1 (B )( 1) factors lo 118. The newly numbered 119 has minor changes 
from the original Commission Order when discussing the value of the emeralds and an 
offset of the fine amount. As the Order on Review remanded the matter for the limited 
purpose of a di:-icussion of Subsection R 164-31-1 (B)( 1) factors, any alterations from the 
original Commission Order as to the value of the emeralds and an offset of the assessed 
fines, beyond organizing the discussion into the new ~19. are hereby stricken. The 
Commission shall therefore issue a corrected Amended Order as indicated herein. 
s. The Order on Review concluded that the fines assessed by the 
Commission were within the scope of the Commission ~s statutory authority! that they 
Wt:re no1 grossly dispropo1tionate to the gravity of the offense so as lo violale the Eighth 
Ame.ndment, anrl that Pe:titioner had not prove11 that the total fine amount was clearly 
unr?a:-:onabh•. in l1ght of the Comrnissjon~ s statutory grant of discretion. Order on 
Review. pp. IS• i 9. The record was clear lhat the Commission considered Subsection 
R 164-3 1-1 (D )(I) in setting the amount of the fine. The parties brought the factors to the 
Commission's attention on severaJ occasions at the hearing.3 The Commission Order 
stated rhat the Commission was authorjzed to consider investor losses,4 a factor provided 
for in Subsection Rl64-3 l-l(B)(1). [n addition, in other parts of the Commission Order, 
other ~\tbscction RI 64-31-1 (B )(I) factors such as the nature, circumstances and 
scriou~nes~ of the violations were mer,Honed as were the costs of the investigation. s 
----·- -·-----
3 Fo, e.<amplc, in <;!osings argt•ments, counstl for both parties fully discussed the factors in Section Rl64-
l 1-l(B)l ').1 rJnscripl, 424:24-25, 425.1-i:,; 448:\3~25; 449:)-6. 
4 Commiss,on Ordc,, 118. 
1 Co1;1m i:,sion 01 der, pp. 2-13. 
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6. The Bxecutive Director has reviewed numerous cases from the 
Commission and lhe Division; she has knowledge of the Commission's statutory 
aulhority and is aware of the precedent with respect to establishing fines for violations of 
the Utah Unifonn Securities Act. The Executive Director was therefore able to conduct a 
meaningful review in light of the Commission's stated findings, its implied findings,6 and 
the Executive Director's own knowledge, See Utah Code Ann. §630-4-206(1 )(b)(iv) 
(providing that a presiding officer may take official notice of any facts ·within the 
agency's specialized knowledge). However, where the Utah Court of Appeals would not 
ha ,,e the same knowledge of the age11cy's precedent, the Executive Director required the 
Commission to state rather than imply its analysis of the rule factors in order to facilitate 
judicial review. 
7. The Executive Director does not consider the Amended Order, with its 
discussion of the factors in Subsection R 164-31-1 to be impennissible bolstering, but 
simply an articulation of the Commission's decision. Therefore, the Amended Order is 
hereby affirmed with the modification indicated herein, removal of any changes from the 
ol'iginal Commission Order in the newly numbered Conclusion of Law 119 regarding the 
value of the emeralds. 
8. As a final matter, in r.onducting this second agency review, the Executive 
Director notes an error in Conclusion of Law paragraph 16, p. 13 of the original Order on 
Review. The second to lhe last sentence of that paragraph does not make mathematical 
'See Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) (providing that relief may be granted only lfa petitioner has been 
prejudiced by agency aclion based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency.) See al.to, 
Aa'ams ,,. Board of /le,,iew of/ndu~·trial Comm'n, 821 P.2d I, S (Utah Ct App. 1991)(holding that 
nnding., may be implied). 
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Finally, even if it were held that the Commission1s authority to issue fines 
for violations of the Securities Act is limited to $10,000.00 per violation, 
the Commission•s Order with its fine of $78,750.00 for four violations of 
the Act would meet such a limit. 
Order on Review, p. 13. This error needs to be noted should this matter be appealed. 
However, where the quoted language is dicta, it does not affect or change the conclusion 
reached by the Executive Director in the first part of paragraph 16 that based on a 
statutory interpretation, the $10,000.00 limit in Utah Code. Ann. §61-1-20(2) for civil 
actions does not apply to this administrative action by the Commission. 
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ORDER ON REVIEW 
T:1e Commission's Amended Order is affirmed with the modification that the text 
of the new ,19 in the Conclusions of Law section revert to the exact language used in the 
original Commission Order when discussing the value of the emeralds. 
NOTICE OF RIG HT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court. of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition 
for R<.:\ 1iew m1,;st comply with the requirements of Sections 630-4-401 and 63G-4-403, 
Utah Code ·\nnotated. ln the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administru:ivc remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bnurgeous v. 
Departrrm:/ of Commerce, et al., 981 P .2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
dat:! of this Order pursuant to Section 6JG .. 4-302. 
~ 
DatcJ this 5 - of June, 2015. 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001342 ' 
~~~ Qj~ 
Francine A. Giani, E;(cutivO~ 
Utah Department of Commerce 
11 
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· CERTlFICA TE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the C:,iV\ day of June1 2015, the undersigned mailed a true and 
c.c,rrect copy of the foregoing Second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
Review by first class and certified mail to: 
MARK W f)UGSLEY ESQ 
MARIA E HECKEL 
I~\ Y QUMNEY & NEBEKER PC 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 14"' FL 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0385 
and caused ~ ::r,py to be electronically mailed to: 
Keith Woodwell. Director (kwoodwell@utah.gov) 
Division of Se:wities 
160 E£1st 300 South 
Salt Like City, UT 84111 
Tom Melton, Assistant Attorney General (tmelton@utah.gov) 
Office of the Attorney General 
B()X 140872 
SAlt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
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§ 61-1-20. Enforcement, UT ST§ 61-1-20 
·•··•··········-·---·-··--··----·-·-·------
!West's Utah Code Annotated 
!Title 61. Securities Division-Real Estate Division 
I Chanter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-20 
§ 61-1-20. Enforcement 
Currentness 
(I) Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act or practice 
constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter, in addition to specific powers granted in this 
chapter: · · 
(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the commission and show cause why an order 
should not be issued directing the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or doing an act in 
furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the date of the hearing; 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a person named in the order; 
(d) the commission shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no sooner than 10 business days after the order is 
issued; 
(e) after a hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in an act or practice constituting a 
violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a fine; 
(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with a licensed broker•dealer or investment adviser in 
this state; and 
(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections (l)(e) through (g). 
1/.:,,.,,,1..:":•,Next -i) 201 !'> Tl1or11siun F~eulers. No dc1im to ori9in.Jf U S. Government Wr.xks. 
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-----______ ,. .. .,._ ........ ---.. -•-•.--••-'•--"'" ---•-.-, ........................... ---·-----. '..., ... ·-···- _ .. ~-·- ... •----·-·- ...... --•- ... -~-·----•---.. -.... -.... ----··•-------···--· ----.. ... 
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the appropriate court of another state to 
enjoin an act or practice and to enforce compliance with this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter. 
(b) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) order restitution; 
(viii) impose a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation of the chapter; and 
(ix) enter any other relief the court considers just. 
(c) The court may not require the division to post a bond in an action brought under this Subsection (2). 
(3) An order issued under Subsection (I) shall be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
--- •----------------•• -••--•-•-••• -•- ". •-- ·•••••-•-•-•--• ••••••• •·•-• • •-• ·•-••• • ••--•-•• '"', m .• •••· 
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···----------·-.. ----·---------------·--------------------
(4) When determining the severity of a sanction to be imposed under this section, the commission or court shall consider 
whether: 
(a) the person against whom the sanction is to be imposed exercised undue influence; or 
(b) the person against whom the sanction is imposed under this section knows or should know that an investor in the 
investment that is the grounds for the sanction is a vulnerable adult. 
Credits 
Laws 1963, c. 145, § I; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 29; Laws 1986, c. 107, § I; Laws 1990, c. 133, § 13; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 70; 
Laws 2009, c. 351, § 19, eff. May l2, 2009; Laws 2011, c. 319, § 3, eff. May 10, 2011. 
Notes of Decisions ( 4) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-20, UT ST§ 61-1-20 
Current through 2015 General Session. 
End of flocumcnt C 2015111oms.111 R1:11ters. No claim 10 original U.S. Oovcmmcnt Works. 




§ 61-1-21.1. Limitation of prosecutions, UT ST§ 61-1-21.1 
---··-------··------------------------~-------·-·--··-........ _ 
I West's Utah Code Annotated 
!Title 61. Securities Division--Real Estate Division 
I Chapter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act fRefs & Annas) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-21.1 
§ 61-1-21.1. Limitation of prosecutions 
Currentness 
(I) No indictment or information may be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the 
alleged violation. 
(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of this chapter, the limitation of prosecutions provided in this section 
supersedes the limitation of actions provided in Section 76-1-302 and Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations. 
Credits 
Laws 1991, c. 161, § 13; Laws 1992, c. 216, § 5; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 134, etT. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (1) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-21.1, UT ST§ 61-1-21. I 
Current through 201 S General Session. 
End of D11cu111ent ,i;; 2015 Thol1\S(ln Reuters. Nu claim tu original ll.S. Government W<•rks. 
\/V?.stlai,vNexr © 2015 Thomson R<:l1ters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
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STATE v. BUSHMAN Utah 833 
Clte111231 P.3d 833 (UtahApp. 2010) 
that whether a postjudgment motion is re- court that D.B. committed these charges of 
quired to preserve these claims of error is theft and criminal trespass. 
dependent on the trial court's opportunity to 
address the issue at the time of decision. 
See In re KF., 2009 UT 41 ~1161-62, 201 
P.3d 985 ("A challenge to the adequacy of 
the court's findings is notably different from 
a challenge to the sufficiency of evi-
dence. . . . It would be superfluous to de-
mand that a party challenge the evidentiary 
support for a court's findings shortly after 
the court articulates them. But it is quite a 
different matter and wholly necessary for a 
party to challenge and thus afford the tiial 
court 'an opportunity to cmTect the alleged 
error' of inadequately detailed findings in 
order to provide for meaningful appellate 
review of the court's decision. . . . A tlial 
court judge has the opportunity to address 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings in his or her judgment. But a 
tiial judge docs not have the chance to ad-
dress the adequacy of the findings them-
selves, unless that issue is brought before 
him or her."). As I have discussed above, 
the trial cow-t had the opportunity to-and 
did-address the notice issue as it was ren-
dering its decision. See supra 11 33. There-
fore, even under the autholity cited by the 
concurring opinion, the instant case would 
be one in which no post.judgment motion 
was required to preserve the issue for ap-
peal. 
11 38 In sum, I do not think that D.B. was 
required to raise an objection in order to 
preserve the error for appeal where (1) the 
error did not arise at trial, (2) requiring an 
objection as the decision was announced is 
not suppol'ted by the preservation rule or the 
pw·poses behind it, and (3) no post.judgment 
motion is necessary to preserve the issue for 
appeal. I would therefore directly address 
the issue D.B. raises on appeal. And consid-
ering the evidence and argument from tiial, 
as properly set forth above, I do not think 
that D.B. was given adequate notice that the 
State was pursing a finding of guilt under an 
accomplice liability theory.12 I would there-
fore reverse the determination of the tiial 
20!0 UT App 120 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Harold Earl BUSHMAN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20080979-CA. 
Cow-t of Appeals of Utah. 
May 6, 2010. 
Background: Defendant entered condi-
tional guilty plea in the Fourth District 
Court, Provo Department, Samuel D. 
McVey, J., to one count of securities fraud 
and six counts of attempted securities 
fraud. Defendant appealed. 
Holding: The Cow-t of Appeals, Thorne, 
J., held that administrative fine was not 
criminal punishment of the sort that could 
trigger double jeopardy protections and 
preclude subsequent criminal punishment. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concw·rcd in the result and issued 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law ~1134.70 
A trial cow·t's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to dismiss criminal charge presents 
a question of law that is reviewed for correct-
ness. 
2. Double Jeopardy €;:::)25 
Stipulation and Consent Order, under 
which Division of Securities ordered defen-
dant to repay clients who were harmed by 
defendant's financial dealings and pay an ad-
ministi·ative fine in the amount of $2,500, did 
not constitute ctiminal punishment and thus 
12, Cndced, I am not convinced that the State issue. 
itself was aware that accomplice liability was at 
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did not trigger double jeopardy protections 
as to preclude future ciiminal prosecution 
and punishment fol' the same acts that gave 
rise to the administa'!ltive action; fine, as 
authorized by Uniform Securities Act, was 
presumptively civil in legislative purpose and 
intent, and the statutol'y scheme was not so 
punitive, either in pm-pose 0l' effect, as to 
transfonn what was clearly intended as a 
civil remedy into a criminal penalty. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; West's U.C.A. 
§ 61-1-1 et seq. 
3. Double Jeopardy e=,5,1 
The 1ight of protect.ion against double 
jeopardy pl'otects only against the imposition 
of multiple ciiminal punishments for the 
same offense, and then only when such oc-
curs in successive pl'oceedings. U.S.C.A. 
ConsLAmend. 5. 
4. Double Jeopardy e=i1 
The constitutional gua1·antee against 
double jeopardy affo1,:ls a ctiminal defendant 
three separate protections by prohibiting: (1) 
a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; (2) a second pl'osecution for 
the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
multiple ci·iminal punishments fol' the same 
offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
5. Double Jeopardy e=i23, 25 
When determining whether a p111ticubu· 
prior punishment ls criminal 01· civil, for pui•-
poses of detel'mining whethel' double jeopal'• 
dy protections are implicated, a cou1t fu'St 
must ask whether the legislatu1·e, in estab-
lishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated 
eithel' expt'eBSly or impliedly a prefei-ence fol' 
one label 01· the othe1·; then, even in those 
eases whei-e the legislature has indicated an 
intention to establish a civil penalty, a court 
must also examine whethe1· the statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in pul'pose or 
effect as to transform what was clearly in-
tended as a civil remedy into a ciiminal 
penalty. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
6. Double Jeopardy e=i25 
When detei,nining whether civil penal-
ties are so punitive, either in pm-pose or 
1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior 
Judge, sal by special assignment pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78A-3-103(2) (2008) and rule 
effect, as to transform the civil 1·emedy into a 
ciiminal penalty in mannet· as to t.rigge1· 
double jeopardy protections and p1•eclude ad-
ditional criminal punishment, couits considet· 
the following: (1) whether civil sanction in-
volves an affirmative disability or restraint; 
(2) whether it has historically been reg111,:led 
as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play 
only on finding of sciente1·; (4) whether its 
operation will promote traditional aims of 
punishment-retlibution and dete1T1mee; (5) 
whether behavior to which it applies is al-
ready a crime; (6) whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected ls assignable for it; and (7) whether it 
appears excessive in relation to alternative 
purpose assigned. U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 6. 
Margaret P. Lindsay and Douglas J. 
Thompson, Spanish Fo1·k, fo1· Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Jeanne 
B. Inouye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 




'ii 1 H111-old E111·l Bushman appeals fi:om his 
convictions on one count of seCU1ities fraud, a 
third degi-ee felony, see Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 61-1-1,-21 (2006 & Supp.2009), and six 
counts of attempt.ad secmities fraud, each a 
class A misdemeanor, see id.i Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-4-101 to-102 (2008). Bushman 
entei-ed a conditional guilty plea to these 
coW1ts, see generaJJ:y State v. Sery, 768 P .2d 
986, 989 (Utah Ct.App.1988), preserving his 
right to appeal the distiict court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss all charges against him 
on double jeopai•dy grounds. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
112 On September 10, 2007, the State 
ch111·ged Bushman with twelve criminal 
counts mising fl'Om a seiies of financial 
I 1-201(6) of lhe Supreme Court Rules of Profes-
sional Practice. 
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transactions in which he had been involved. (minus any amounts actually paid to the 
On July 301 20081 Bushman filed a motion to victims) will be due to the Division by 
dismiss, arguing that the criminal prosecu- October 1, 2007. 
tion against him violated the Double Jeopar- Bushman repaid his victims in full within the 
dy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the time frame contemplated in the Consent Or-
United States Constitution, see U.S. Const. der and also timely paid the remaining $2500 
amend. V. Bushman's motion argued that he of the fine to the Division. 
had already been punished for the acts al- '1 5 Bushman's motion to dismiss the crimi-
leged in the information when he entered nal charges against him argued that the Con-
into a Stipulation and Consent Order (the sent Order constituted a criminal punishment 
Consent Order) with the Utah Division of for his violations of the Act and that the 
Secuiities (the Division) to resolve an investi- subsequent criminal prosecution was there-
gation conducted by the Division regarding fore barred as placing him in double jeopar-
those same acts. dy. The district court denied Bushman's 
'ii 3 The Consent Order, entered July 3, motion, ruling that the Consent Order im-
2007, contained extensive investigative find- posed an administrative sanction rather than 
ings cataloguing Bushman's financial activi- a punitive one and that Bushman had there-
ties. The Consent Order concluded that fore not been placed in c1iminal jeopardy by 
Bushman's actions constituted willful viola- the Consent Order. Bushman subsequently 
tions of the Utah Uniform Secuiities Act (the entered a conditional plea of guilty to re-
Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to-25 duced charges and now appeals the district 
(2006 & Supp.2009), and required Bushman court's ruling on his motion to dismiss. 
to cease and desist from any fw·ther viola-
tions of the Act. Finally, the Consent Order 
required Bushman to pay a fine. The Con-
sent Order also stated that it did not protect 
Bushman from potential civil liability to third 
parties nor did it "affect any c1iminal cause 
of action that a prosecutor might b1ing ... 
,i 4 The fine imposed by the Consent Order 
was structured to encourage Bushman to 
promptly compensate his victims for their 
losses and to obey the Division's cease and 
desist order. The Consent Order stated, 
Harold Earl Bushman [shall] pay a fine of 
nineteen thousand three hundred dollars 
($19,300) to the Division by Monday, Octo-
ber 1, 20071 reduced dollar for dollar for 
any money paid to the victims by July 15, 
2007. The total owed to the victims is 
$14,300. If Bushman pays the victims in 
full by July 16, 2007, the Division will 
waive half of the remaining fine of $5,000, 
leaving $2,600 due by October 1, 2007. If 
at any time the Division discovers that 
Bushman acted in violation of Utah securi-
ties laws, the waived portion of the fine 
would be due to the Division within one 
month of the date on which the Division 
gives Bushman wiitten notice. If Bush-
man fails to pay the victims in full by July 
15, 2007, the entire amount of the fine 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[l] ,i 6 Bushman's sole argument on ap-
peal is that the dist.J.ict cow-t erred in deny-
ing his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds. u 'A trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to dismiss presents a ques-
tion of law, which we review for correct-
ness."' State v. Bernert, 2004 UT App 321, 
,i 61 100 P.3d 221 (quoting State v. Horrocks, 
2001 UT App 4, ,i 10, 17 P.3d 1145). 
ANALYSIS 
[2] ,i 7 Bushman's appeal presents the 
issue of whether an administrative fine under 
the Act, such as that imposed in the Consent 
Order, triggers the Double Jeopardy Clause 
so as to preclude future criminal prosecution 
for the same acts giving rise to the adminis-
trative action. We agree with the distiict 
court that such a fine does not constitute 
p1ior criminal punishment such as to impli-
cate double jeopardy and, accordingly, we 
affirm Bushman's convictions. 
[3, 4) 118 The Double Jeopardy Clause 
provides that no "person [shall] be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. 
V. In Iludson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 
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118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), the 
Supreme Court stated that it has "long rec-
ognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not prohibit the imposition of ail addi-
tional sanctions that could, in common par-
lance, be described as punishment." / d. at 
98-99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Rather, 11[t]he Clause pro-
tects only against the imposition of multiple 
criminal punishments for the same offense, 
and then only when such occw·s in successive 
proceedings." Id. Thus, "[t]he constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy affords a 
ciiminal defendant three separate protec-
tions by prohibiting: (1) a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a 
second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and (3) multiple [c1iminal] pun-
Lc;hments for the same offense." Staie v. 
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990). 
(5) 119 Bushman argues that the' Consent 
Order constitutes criminal punishment such 
that any subsequent criminal conviction and 
penalty would present "multiple punishments 
for the same offense," see id. Hudson, the 
Supreme Court's most recent decision on the 
subject, focused on the double jeopardy im-
plications of administrative sanctions and 
outlined a two-step test for determining 
"[w]hether a particular [prior] punishment is 
ciirninal or civil." 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 
488. First, a court must "ask whether the 
legislatw·e, 1in establishing the penalizing 
mechanism, indicated either expressly or im-
pliedly a preference for one label or the 
other.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 
448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 
742 (1980)). Then, "[e]ven in those cases 
where the legislatw·e has indicated an inten-
tion to establish a civil penalty," id., a cow-t 
must also examine uwhether the statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in pw-pose or 
effect as to transfor[m] what was clearly 
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty," id. (alteration in otiginal) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
I. Legislative Intent 
,r 10 The first prong of the Hudson test 
requires us to determine whether the legisla-
2. The Hudson court limited this line of reasoning 
lo the debarment order because the fines at issue 
were expressly labeled as civil in the enabling 
ture intended administrative sanctions uncle1· 
the Act to be criminal or civil in natw·e. 
Hudson held that certain sanctions-fines 
and occupational debarment-imposed by 
federal banking regulators pw·suant to feder-
al statutes were intended to be civil sanc-
tions. See id. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488. The 
Court reasoned that "[w]hile the provision 
authorizing debarment contains no language 
explicitly denominating the sanction as civil," 
see id., it is "significant that the authoiity to 
issue debarment orders is conf ei,·ed upon the 
approp1iate Federal banking agenc[ies]," see 
id. (alteration in oliginal) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Cow·t stated, "That 
such authority was confe1Ted upon adminis-
trative agencies is prima facie evidence that 
Congress intended to provide for a civil sanc-
tion.'' IcL2 
V 11 AB with the debarment sanction in 
Hudson, the fine contained in the Consent 
Order was imposed pw·suant to the Act's 
conferral of autho1ity upon the Division, an 
administrative agency. Accordingly, such 
fines and other sanctions imposed by the 
Division under the Act are presumptively 
civil in pw-pose and intent. See id. Bush-
man's only real argument for criminal legisla-
tive intent is the fact that the Act authorizes 
both administrative and c1iminal sanctions. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (Supp.2009) 
(authorizing agency enforcement of secuiities 
regulations); id. § 61-1-21 (authorizing 
ciiminal enforcement of securities regula-
tions). However, the fact that the adminis-
trative and ci·iminal sanctions are autho1ized 
by two separate sections of the Act suggests 
to us that the administrative sanctions are 
not intended to be ciiminal in natw·e. See 
generaJ,ly State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, 
ml 25-26, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772 (110f the 
fifty-seven sections in [New Mexico,s Secmi-
ties] Act, only one section specifies c1iminal 
conduct .... We determine that, as opposed 
to [the section] that provides for ciiminal 
penalties, the legislative pm-pose in enacting 
the civil penalty was that the penalty consti-
tute an integral part of an overall remedial 
statutes. See llud.so11 v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, 103, 118 S.Cl. 488, I 39 L.Ed.2d 450 ( I 997). 
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regulatory and administrative scheme to pro- proof will suffice to override legislative intent 
tect the public."). and transform what has been denominated a 
4iJ 12 Bushman has failed to overcome the 
presumption that the legislature intended the 
Act's administrative sanctions to be civil in 
nature when it authorized the Division, an 
agency, to administer them. See generally 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488. We 
therefore hold that the legislature intended 
that administrative sanctions under the Act, 
such as those imposed by the Consent Order, 
be deemed civil in nature. 
II. Purpose or Effect 
~ 13 Having determined that the legisla-
ture intended administrative sanctions under 
the Act to be civil, we next tum to the 
question of "whether the statutory scheme 
was so punitive either in purpose or effect as 
to transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a 
civil remedy into a criminal penalty." H1ui-
son v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 
S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 {1997) (alteration 
in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). In making this determina-
tion, the Hudson Court described the factors 
enumerated in Kennedy v. M endozar-M ar-
tinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 
L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), as "useful guideposts." 
See Hwblon, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. 
[6] 1114 The Kennedy factors include 
(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an af-
firmative disability or restraint"; (2) 
"whether it has historically been regarded 
as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) 
"whether its operation will promote the 
traditional aims of punishment-retiibution 
and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behav-
ior to which it applies is already a crime"; 
(6) "whether an alternative purpose to 
which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it ap-
pears excessive in relation to the alterna-
tive purpose assigned." 
Id. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-
69), 83 S.Ct. 554. "[T]hese factors must be 
considered in relation to the statute on its 
face," id. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), and "only the clearest 
civil remedy into a ciiminal penalty," id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
1115 Addressing the seven Kennedy factors 
in order, we first conclude that the Act does 
not allow the administrative imposition of an 
affirmative disability or restraint. The sanc-
tions that the Division can impose under the 
Act-cease and desist orders, monetary 
fines, and bars against association with licen-
sees under the Act, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-20(1)-do not constitute affirmative 
disabilities or restraints for purposes of Ken-
nedy. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118 
S.Ct. 488 (providing that a monetary fine 
coupled with an indefinite ban on working in 
the banking industry did not constitute an 
"affirmative disability or restraint" because 
the sanctions did not "approach[ ] the infa-
mous punishment of imprisonment" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). We also note 
that civil penalties under the Act do "not 
carry the stigma of a ciiminal conviction." 
See State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, 11 30, 
133 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772. 
CJ 16 Second, neither monetary fines nor 
the other administrative sanctions that may 
be imposed under the Act have historically 
been regarded as punishment. See Hudson, 
622 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488 ("[N]either 
money penalties nor debarment has histori-
cally been viewed as punishment."); United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 256, 100 S.Ct. 
2636, 66 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) ("[M]onetary assessments are 
traditionally a form of civil remedy."). 
1117 Third, administrative sanctions under 
the Act do not require a finding of scienter 
or other mental state. Utah Code section 
61-1-20 allows for the imposition of adminis-
trative sanctions "[ w Jhenever it appears to 
the director [of the Division] that a person 
has engaged, is engaging, or is about to 
engage in an act or practice constituting a 
violation of this chapter or a rule or order 
under this chapter," without regard to the 
violator's mental state. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-20. By contrast, Utah Code section 
61-1-21 allows for criminal penalties for se-
cu1ities violations only for actions that are 
willful or knowing. See id. § 61-1-21. 
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1118 Fourth, we determine that the Act's 
administrative sanctions-fines, in particu-
lar-do incidentally promote 1·etJ.ibution and 
deterrence, both of which are traditional 
aims of punishment. However, such sanc-
tions are "plainly part of the [Division's] ar-
senal for regulation of persons dealing in the 
sale of secmities to the public, and speak[ J 
as much, if not more, to that regulatory 
challenge than to a sole need to punish." 
Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, 1134. As such, we 
determine that "while the civil penalty may 
by its nature have effects of deterrence and 
punishment, those effects are incidental to 
and do not oveii.ide the Act's and the civil 
penalty's primarily remedial pm-pose." Id. 
11 19 Fifth, the actions for which the Act 
imposes administJ.•ative sanctions-violations 
of Utah securities laws-do not constitute 
criminal behavior under the Act unless un-
dertaken with the appropriate mental state. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (imposing 
c1iminal penalties only for willful or knowing 
acts). Thus, only some of the "behavior to 
which [the Division's civil authority] applies 
is already a crime" under the Act, and we do 
not deem this factor to cut in favor of a 
criminal pm-pose or effect. See Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 872 U.S. 144, 168, 88 
S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). But see 
Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, ~ 35 (holding fifth 
Kennedy factor satisfied, despite differing 
scienter requirements, where "it is clear that 
the conduct upon which the civil penalty was 
based also formed the basis of Defendant's 
indictment"). 
1120 Sixth, we determine that there are 
alternative, nonpunitive pm-poses to which 
the Act's administrative sanctions may be 
rationally connected. Certainly, the struc-
tured fine contained in the Consent Order, 
see supra 11 4, was intended to encourage 
Bushman's prompt restitution of his victims, 
a purpose that is clearly nonpunitive. Al-
though a small portion of the overall fme did 
not go towards restitution,3 securities regula-
tions such as the Act also "regulate a lawful 
3, Bushman, citing Slate v. Mendoza, 938 P.2d 
303 (Utah CLApp.1997), argues thal the portion 
or the fine not going toward resliLution must be 
justified by some nonpunitive reason such as 
covering the cost or the administrative investiga• 
tion. However, we no longer view Mendoza as 
and important financial industJ.-y so that in-
vestors are not deceived or swindled through 
acts and practices ow· Legislature believes to 
be wrongful and harmful to society." State 
v. Kirby, 2008-NMCA-074, ~ 36, 138 N.M. 
782, 70 P.3d 772; see also Seciirities & Exch. 
Comm'n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860,866 (2d 
Cfr.1998) ("[T]he deterrence of secmities 
fraud serves other important nonpunitive 
goals, such as encom·aging investor confi-
dence, increasing the efficiency of financial 
markets, and promoting the stability of the 
secmities industJ.-y."). Additionally, fines im-
posed by the Division go into a fund fo1· 
investor education and training, fmi:her sup-
porting the nonpunitive nature of such fines. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-18.7 (Supp. 
2009); cf. Ki?'by, 2003-NMCA-074, ~ 36 
("The Legislatm·e has added substance to the 
remedial purposes of the Act by earmarking 
the civil penalty funds for public education 
and training on securities matters."). For 
these reasons, we determine that the Act's 
administJ.·ative sanctions may be rationally 
connected to purposes other than punish-
ment. 
1121 Finally, the administrative sanctions 
do not appear excessive in relation to the 
alternative purposes we have identified. As 
stated by the New Mexico Comt of Appeals 
in discussing that state's version of the Act, 
The Secwities Act regulates lawful and 
often complex transactions in which New 
Mexico citizens engage for their financial 
secmity. Fraudulent practices in secwi-
ties transactions required the United 
States Congress as well as states to pass 
comprehensive regulato1-y and administra-
tive remedial legislation. The Secutities 
Act's p1imai-y pm-pose is remedial, heavily 
01iented toward asswing that members of 
t11e public are not swindled through decep-
tive practices. The civil penalty is at-
tached to an important pait of the remedi-
al aspect of the Securities Act. In any 
measurement, it is not a sanction that is 
out of proportion or excessive when consid-
controlling authority in light of its reliance on 
the double jeopardy analysis contained in United 
Stales v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.CL 1892, 
104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), which was substantially 
overruled by 1/udson. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 
96, 118 S.Ct. 488. 
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ering the obvious legislative view that an CONCLUSION 
essential, if not the most effective, way to 
prevent and remedy deceptive practices is 
through a comprehensive regulatory and 
administrative legislative scheme. 
Kirby, 2003-NMCA--074, ~ 37. We agree 
and determine that Utah's Act is similarly 
not excessive in relation to its beneficial and 
remedial purpose.~ 
11 22 In sum, the only Kennedy factor that 
'124 We conclude that Bushman's criminal 
convictions are not barred by double jeopar-
dy because the fine imposed by the Consent 
Order is a civil penalty and not criminal 
punishment for pm-poses of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. Accordingly, the district court 
properly denied Bushman's motion to dis-
miss, and we affirm Bushman's convictions. 
could minimally suggest that administrative ,i 25 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
sanctions under the Act should be deemed Senior Judge. 
criminal punishment is the fact that, in some 
cases, civil sanctions could be imposed for 
behavior that also constitutes a crime under 
the Act. See supra ti 19. However, this one 
factor alone is not enough to override the 
legislature's intent to make the Act's admin-
istrative sanctions civil in natw·e. See Hud-
son v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105, 118 
S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) C'[T]he 
conduct for which OCC sanctions are im-
posed may also be criminal (and in this case 
formed the basis for petitioners' indict-
ments). This fact is insufficient to render 
the money penalties and debarment sanc-
tions criminally punitive, particularly in the 
double jeopardy context." (citations omit,.. 
ted)); see ~o United States v. Di.wn, 509 
U.S. 688, 704, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 
556 (1993) (rejecting "same-conduct" test for 
double jeopardy purposes). Thus, we hold 
that administrative sanctions for violations of 
the Act are civil in nature and that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude 
subsequent criminal prosecutions under the 
Act ru.ising from the same underlying facts. 
~ 23 In light of our holding, the district 
court's order denying Bushman's motion to 
dismiss is correct. The Consent Order does 
not constitute a criminal punishment and 
therefore does not implicate the Double 
,Jeopardy Clause, Accordingly1 the State 
was not barred from seeking and obtaining 
subsequent c1iminal convictions against 
Bushman for his violations of the Act. 
4. We note that the fines that the Division could 
impose and judicially enforce were limited lo 
$500 for each violation or the Act al the time of 
the entry of the Consent Order, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-l-20(2)(h}(vli) (2006), and are now 
limited to $10,000 per violation, sec id. § 61-1-
20(2)(b)(viii) (Supp.2009). We express no opin-
ORME, Judge (concurring in the result): 
1126 I concur in this court's judgment af-
firming the district court's denial of Bush-
man's motion to dismiss all chru.·ges against 
him on double jeopardy grounds. But I do 
not see any need to discuss at length the 
intricacies of double jeopardy jurisprudence. 
In my view, Bushman waived any claim he 
might otherwise have under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause when he voluntarily entered 
into the Consent Order and specifically 
agreed that the Consent Order was no bru.· to 
"any ciiminal cause of action that a prosecu-
tor might bring." 
'1 27 Without such a provision, Bushman 
might at least have a good due process ru.·gu-
ment that he should be relieved of his obli-
gations under the Consent Order, as most 
citizens would assume that by entering into 
such an agreement with an enforcement arm 
of the State, they were buying comprehen-
sive peace with the State. But with such a 
provision in place, Bushman did not proceed 
under any such misapprehension and, on the 
contrary, expressly recognized the possibility 
that a ci·iminal prosecution might be forth-
coming and that the Consent Order had no 
effect on the validity of any such prosecution. 
ion as to whether a fine that is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of the underlying securities 
violation might give rise to some sort of as• 
applied double jeopardy challenge in the appro-
priate case; this case, however, does not present 
such circumstances. 
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!United States Code Annotated 
!Constitution of the United States 
I Annotated 
I Amendment VIII. Excessive Bail, Fines, Punishments 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VIII 
Amendment VIII. Excessive Bail, Fines, Punishments 
Currentness 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Notes of Decisions (6032) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VIII, USCA CONST Amend. VIIJ 
Current through P.L. 114-49 approved 8-7-2015 
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RlSl-4. Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures Act Rule. 
RlSl-4-708. Standard of Proof. 
Unless otherwise provided by statute or a rule applicable to 
a specific proceeding, the standard of proof in a proceeding under 
this rule (RlSl-4), whether initiated by a notice of agency action 
or request for agency action, is a preponderance of the evidence. 
RlSl-4-709. Burden of Proof. 
Unless otherwise provided by statute: 
(1) the department has the burden of proof in a proceeding 
initiated by a notice of agency action; and 
(2} the party who seeks action from the department has the burden 
of proof in a proceeding initiated by a request for agency action. 
KEY: administrative procedures, 
government hearings 
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive 
Authorizing, and Implemented or 
63G-4-102(6) 
adjudicative proceedings, 
Amendment: April 10, 2015 
Interpreted Law: 13-1-6; 
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R164-31. Administrative Fines. 
R164-31-1. Guidelines for the Assessment of Administrative Fines. 
(A} Authority and purpose. 
(l} The Division enacts this rule under authority granted by 
Sections 61-1-6, 61-1-12, 61-1-14, 61-1-20 and 61-1-24. 
( 2) This rule identifies guidelines for the assessment of 
administrative fines. The guidelines should not be considered 
all-inclusive but rather are intended to provide factors to be 
considered when imposing a fine. 
(B} Guidelines. 
(1) For the purpose of determining the amount of an 
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, the Commission shall consider the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and 
persistence of the conduct constituting the violation; 
(b) the harm to other persons, including the amount of investor 
losses, resulting either directly or indirectly from the violation; 
(c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other 
consideration received directly or indirectly by the person in 
connection with the violation; 
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the 
Division concerning the violation, efforts to prevent future 
occurrences of the violation, and efforts to mitigate the harm caused 
by the violation, including any restitution paid or disgorgement of 
ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the acts of the person; 
(e) the history of previous violations by the person; 
(f) the need to deter the person or other persons from committing 
such violations in the future; 
(g) the costs of the Division incurred in investigating and 
prosecuting the action; and 
(h) such other matters as justice may require. 
KEY: administrative fines, securities regulation, securities 
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: January 8, 2013 
Notice of Continuation: May 28, 2013 
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law: 61-1-6; 61-1-12; 
61-1-14; 61-1-20; 61-1-24 
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